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The Aral Sea, whose basin includes the countries of Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, occupies an area of
66,000 km2 and a volume of 1,060 km3 in 1960.  Since 1960, the amount of
irrigated land has increased by 100%, and the population in the basin has
increased by140%.  The flow from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, the rivers
which supply 90% of the Aral Sea’s water resources, was diverted for irrigation
and to sustain the booming population since the 1950s.  As a result, the Aral Sea
has lost 50% of its surface area and 66% of it volume, and has become an
environmental disaster area.
Before the fall of the Union Soviet Socialist Republic, the water resources
in Central Asia were shared between the Republics.  Since the fall of the USSR,
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the topic of water rights has emerged.  The downstream nations of Turkmenistan,
Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan are dependent on the Aral Sea basin for irrigation
especially during the hot summer months.  The upstream nations of Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan are dependent on the Aral Sea basin for hydroelectric power
especially during the cold winter months.  As these Central Asian countries try to
negotiate treaties and regulations on water use, the Helsinki Rules have been cited
and quoted as being the standard in determining the rights of the upstream
countries to release or hold water storage.
The Helsinki Convention, redrafted in May 1997 and adopted by the
International Law Commission list 11 factors, to be weighed equally, in
determining water rights: (1) the extent of drainage area, (2) the contribution of
water, (3) the climate, (4) past and present utilization of the waters, (5) economic
and social needs, (6) population dependent on the waters, (7) comparative costs of
social and economic alternatives, (8) availability of other resources, (9) the
optimization of the waters, (10) practicability of compensation , and (11) the
degree to which a nation may be satisfied without causing harm to another nation.
These factors were analyzed in respect of the Aral Sea basin to determine the
water rights of each country.
The hydrology of the Aral Sea basin is analyzed using Geographic
Information Systems (GIS).   The watershed and streams of the basin are
delineated to compute the extent of watershed within each country: the
downstream countries, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan have the
greatest shares of the Aral Sea basin.  GIS is also used to compute the evaporation
vii
and water surplus of the area.  A snowmelt component based on precipitation as
rain and snow is incorporated to the program because of the high altitudes (greater
than 8,000 meters) and low temperatures (average below 0oC) in part of the basin.
The results showed that the upstream countries, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan,
produce the largest amount of water surplus in the Aral Sea basin.
The economy of Central Asia has suffered tremendously since the fall of
the Soviet Union.  There are high rates of inflation, poverty, unemployment,
credit shortages, and declines in the gross domestic product (GDP).  Furthermore,
the Aral Sea crisis, with the pollution of the rivers, and the salt windstorms, has
caused cancer, anemia, miscarriages, and respiratory and circulatory problems, to
increase substantially, especially in the regions nearest to the Aral Sea.
The conclusion of this thesis is that the non-hydrologic factors of The
Helsinki Convention are hard to answer and apply to circumstances.  The
economic or social dependence of one country is hard to rate or classify above
another country’s.  GDP, social, employment, and health statistics cannot be the
only basis for determining who is more “dependent.  However, based on the
hydrologic study, all five countries have equal rights to the Aral Sea waters.
viii
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The Central Asian Republics of Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan depend on the rivers which feed the Aral Sea for
hydroelectric power and irrigation.  Due to large-scale diversion of the Amu
Darya and Syr Darya rivers since the 1950s to irrigate Central Asian cotton fields,
the Aral Sea has lost half of its surface area and two thirds of its volume.  Water
quality continues to decrease as the lake level drops, and windstorms on the
former sea bottom carry salty grit to area residents, who suffer from respiratory
ailments and throat cancer (World Bank, 1996).
Since 1960, the population of the Central Asian republics has increased
from about 13.6 million to 32.8 million, or by 140 percent. In that same time,
agricultural production per year of key crops such as cotton rose by 100 percent to
7.7 million metric tons per year, with a corresponding increase in the amount of
land under irrigation.  Meanwhile, output in industrial enterprises involving
substantial abstraction or diversion of water climbed steeply to very high levels:
steel production rose by 200 percent, cement production rose by 170 percent, and
electricity production rose by a factor of twelve (Gleason, 1991).
The growth in population, industry and agriculture have strained Central
Asia’s limited water resources. There is very little precipitation to support the
great demand for water except from rivers which originate in the high mountain
ranges in the eastern parts of Central Asia.  Before the fall of the Soviet Union in
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1991, the five Central Asian countries were considered as states where natural and
economic resources, and costs were shared equally.  Times have changed; the
upstream countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan utilize the water in the rivers
mostly to produce hydroelectric power, especially during the cold winter months.
Meanwhile, the downstream countries of Kazakstan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan utilize the waters for agricultural purposes in the summertime.  This
has caused great debate over who has the right to the water in the Aral Sea basin.
Do the upstream countries have the right to detain the water from downstream
countries, to release waters at times which may not be optimal for the downstream
countries, or do downstream countries have the priority to use those waters due to
their pattern of historical use? These questions will be explored below.
Condition of the Aral Sea
The increased diversion of water from the Aral Sea basin rivers has
allowed the development of massive agricultural complex in Central Asia, while
at the same time degrading the ecosystem and environment of the region.  The
flow of the Syr Darya between 1974 and 1986 never reached the Aral Sea due to
diversion for irrigation purposes.  In 1982, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1989, there was
absolutely no inflow from the Amu Darya into the Aral Sea (Bortnik, 1992).  This
caused the Aral Sea level to decrease by 89 to 109 centimeters per year between
1974 and 1989.  Furthermore, the decrease in sea level has caused the Aral Sea to
separate into 2 water bodies the Small and Large Aral Seas (Maloye More and
Bol’-shoye More) each being nourished by separate rivers, the Syr Darya, and
Amu Darya, respectively.
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The Aral Sea has attained a salinity of 30 grams per liter, which is
comparable to the North Sea (Klotzli, 1994).  An increase in salinity is
“determined for the most part by an increase in the concentration of salts upon a
decrease in water volume” (Bortnik, 1992).  The Aral Sea’s increasing salinity has
destroyed the ecosystem causing irreversible changes.  Rising salinity levels have
eliminated the commercially-valuable fish in the sea, and have caused salt
windstorms detrimental to the population’s health.
Aral Sea Disaster Zone
The Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, suffering more than any
other region in Central Asia from the cumulative effects of the Aral Sea crisis, is
located in Uzbekistan at the delta of the Amu Darya.  Due to decades of irrigation
that paid more attention to centrally-planned quotas than the state of the
environment, nearly the whole of Karakalpakstan is either salinized or
waterlogged (OneWorld, 1997).  Key factors harming the environment are
discharge of highly mineralized, pesticide-rich return flows into rivers, use of
unlined irrigation canals leading to waste and seepage of salts into groundwater,
waterlogged fields leading to salty groundwater and salt runoff, and no drainage
network to remove unwanted water and chemicals from the fields (FAO, 1997).
By the end of the 1980s, more than three billion cubic meters of drainage water
contaminated with agricultural chemicals from Uzbek and Turkmen fields,
together with untreated industrial and municipal wastes, were being dumped in
the Amu Darya River each year.  Much of it ended up in Karakalpakstan, where it
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poisoned aquatic ecosystems and contaminated drinking water supplies
(OneWorld, 1997).
The degraded environment has caused many problems to the economy and
the population of Karakalpakstan.  Most fisherman have lost their jobs due to the
decreasing shoreline and increasing water pollution.  There has been an increase
of total mortality by 15 times, of cardiac and vascular diseases by 1.6 times, of
tuberculosis by 6 times, of gallstone disease by 5 times, and of throat cancer by 7
to 10 times (DEV, 1997).  The people of Karakalpakstan also suffer from rising
rates of thyroid and kidney disease.  Over the period 1981 to 1987, it is estimated
that liver cancers soared an incredible 200 percent, throat cancers were up 25
percent and infant mortality climbed 20 percent (FAO, 1997).
Sadly, there are little funds being used to save Karakalpakstan.  Most of
the watershed states are now busy trying to squeeze as much water out of the
Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers as possible. Ironically, the extra water, they
argue, is needed to expand irrigated agriculture (mostly cotton for export), which
each of the region’s governments sees as a way to improve their faltering
economies.  Environmental concerns have been shoved aside by short-term
economic considerations (OneWorld, 1997).
STUDY AREA
The study area for this thesis is the Aral Sea Basin, which is surrounded
by the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakstan
(Figure 1.1).  The Aral Sea is supplied by two main rivers, the Amu Darya and the
Syr Darya. The area of these countries is approximately 3.99 million square
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kilometers while the Aral Sea Basin has an area of 1.512 million square
kilometers.
Figure 1.1: Map of the Aral Sea Region
Topographically, the Aral Sea Basin is complicated (Figure 1.2).  It ranges
from the vast Turanian Plains in the West to the tremendous mountain ranges of
the Pamirs and Tien Shan  joining in the south and southeast, with peaks reaching
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6000 to 8000 meters and higher.  The plains make up about 80% of the total area
of the basin, while mountains occupy about 20% of the area (UNEP, 1991).
Figure 1.2: Topography of the Aral Sea Region
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The climate in the northern part of the basin is continental.  In the southern
parts, it is subtropical.  The high mountain areas, with precipitation from 800 to
1600 millimeters, are humid and account for the moisture surplus in the region
(Klotzli, 1994).  Water from the two rivers, Amu Darya and Syr Darya, irrigate
roughly 75% by area of production of Central Asia’s agriculture.  Water resources
are mainly surface waters that are concentrated in the huge mountains forming the
catchment zone of the water cycle in the region.  Melting water from extended
permanent snow fields and glaciers feed the powerful rivers of Amu Darya and
Syr Darya mostly during spring thaw. The Tien Shan and Pamir ridges have
together more than 18,000 square kilometers of ice cover.
The Amu Darya with 2,540 km from the confluence of the Pyandzh and
Vakhsh to the Aral is the largest river and most important drainage basin in
Central Asia, whereas the Syr Darya stretches some 2200 km in length from the
Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan through the Fergana Valley, the Hunger Steppe and
the Kysyl Kum desert.  The two main rivers of the Aral Sea basin account for
about 90% of the annual river flow.  The rivers have their maximum discharge
when they leave the mountains, but naturally lose half of their flow through




Domestic laws in any sovereign state are usually written laws based on
tradition, common law, and administrative rules which citizens are obligated to
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follow.  In the international arena, laws are consensual and a country usually
consents to international laws because the long-term benefits outweigh the long-
term costs.  International laws can be proven or established by the existence of
treaties or conventions to which a large number of nations have agreed to be
bound.   An international law can also be shown to exist if it has been formally
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.  Adoption by any other UN
agency may provide support for the assertion that a principle is in fact an
international law, but such an adoption cannot stand alone.  It can provide
significant proof only when a substantial majority including major world powers
have adopted the resolution (Draper, 1997).
There are not many treaties or laws that dictate the proper use of
international waters.  The United Nations provides the mechanism to identify
solutions to disputes or problems, and to deal with virtually any matter of concern
to humanity.  The United Nations has only one convention on international
waters, which addresses the problem of equitable sharing,  The Helsinki Rules of
the International Law Association on the Uses of the Waters of International
Waters (1966).  The “Helsinki Rules” were adopted by the International Law
Association (ILA) in 1966 and the United Nations International Law Commission
(UN-ILC) in 1994 (MFA, 1996).  The Commission is composed of 34 members
who serve in their individual capacity as international law experts and represent
the principal legal systems of the world.  The Commission, which was established
on 21 November 1947 by the UN General Assembly to initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of
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international law and its codification, has been at the center of standard setting in
its preparation of drafts that have served as the basis for the adoption of legal
rules to regulate relations among States.
Chapter 2, Article V of the Helsinki Rules states the following (Appendix
A):
1. Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and
equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international
drainage basin.  This equitable sharing is to be determined in the light
of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
2. Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not
limited to:
• The geography of the basin, including the extent of the drainage
area in the territory of each basin State;
• The hydrology of the basin, including the contribution of water by
each basin State;
• The climate affecting the basin;
• The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including existing
utilization;
• The economic and social needs of each basin State;
• The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin
State;
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• The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin State;
• The availability of other resources;
• The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of
the basin;
• The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin
States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
• The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In
determining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors
are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the
whole.
This law was revised in May 1997 and called “The Convention on the
Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourse” (Appendix B).
However most of the relevant factors related to equitable and reasonable
utilization of water remained the same.   
The reliability and obligation of using the Helsinki Rules to determine
water rights must be established before applying the Helsinki Rules to water
rights in Central Asia.  Draper (1997) discusses the four duties under international
law of sharing transboundary water resources: the duty to cooperate and to
negotiate in good faith, the duty to prevent unreasonable harm, the duty of
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equitable utilization, and the duty to exchange data and information.  He argues
that there does not appear to be any sufficient proof that the principle of equitable
utilization is an international legal norm to which all states involved in a water
sharing agreement must adhere.  For this study area, this argument can easily be
discredited.  Although the UN General Assembly has not formerly adopted the
Helsinki Rules, the UN International Law Commission, established by the
General Assembly, has adopted the Helsinki Rules.  Also, all five of the Central
Asian countries are members of the UN and have repeatedly quoted and supported
the Helsinki Rules as a basis for water rights in documents, meetings, and treaties.
This also discredits Draper’s questions about whether countries are obligated to
follow "equitable and reasonable" principles as a matter of international law or
whether these obligations must be explicitly agreed upon.
Draper (1997) also argues that the fulfillment of the duty to prevent
unreasonable harm and the duty of equitable utilization can be challenged due to
the vagueness of terms; does "reasonable and equitable utilization" mean
beneficial use, what is the difference between reasonable harm and unreasonable
harm, and how can a country quantify the difference between using waters for
agricultural purposes and environmental protection and which is a priority?
Objectives and Methodology
The original Helsinki Rules, and their revised version, have similar criteria
to determine water rights. The most important characteristics in determining
equitable use of international waters are social-economic factors, the hydrology
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and environment of the basin, and the satisfaction of one country without
damaging another country or the environment.
The methodology for this study is therefore partitioned according to the
major criteria for water rights.  First, the hydrology and climate study of the
region is analyzed using Geographic Information Systems (GIS).  GIS is used to
delineate the watersheds and streams which feed the Aral Sea.  These data are
used to determine each country’ share of the watersheds.  The water surplus from
rain and snow is also determined using GIS, and each country’s contribution to
the water surplus is also calculated.
Second, the social and economic needs of each country, their available
resources, and their dependence on the Aral Sea waters are discussed.  The
Helsinki Rules specify that the social and economic status of a country is equally
important as its hydrology in determining water rights.  Chapter 3 also includes
the effects of the crisis of the Aral Sea on each country’s economy and
population.
Third, the past utilization of the waters, the conservation, the protection,
and the development of the Aral Sea basin are discussed in Chapter 4.   The
treaties which are currently being practiced between the countries and their
justification under the Helsinki Rules are also discussed.  Finally, Chapter 6
examines the data from the previous chapters, and discusses the conclusions,
further work, and limitations.
13
Chapter 2: The Hydrology and Climate of the Aral Sea Basin
Using Geographic Information Systems
INTRODUCTION
A geographic information system (GIS) is a computer-based tool for
mapping and analyzing things that exist and events that happen on Earth. GIS
technology integrates common database operations such as query and statistical
analysis with the unique visualization and geographic analysis benefits offered by
maps.  These abilities distinguish GIS from other information systems and make it
valuable to a wide range of public and private enterprises for explaining events,
predicting outcomes, and planning strategies.
This chapter explains the methodology of performing a spatial hydrologic
study of the Aral Sea basin.  The topics covered include inland catchments,
watershed and stream delineation, soil water balance and snowmelt runoff.
SPATIAL HYDROLOGY OF THE ARAL SEA
Stream and Watershed Delineation
The shape of a surface determines how water will flow across it. The
hydrologic analysis tools of GIS provide a method to describe the physical
characteristics of a surface.  Using a digital elevation model as input, it is possible
to delineate a drainage system and then to quantify the characteristics of that
system.  Watersheds can be delineated from a Digital Elevation Model (DEM)
using the output from the flowdirection function of ArcInfo.  The area upon which
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water falls, and the network through which it travels to an outlet is referred to as a
drainage system.
Digital Elevation Model
A topographic map, which is a ramp-shaded presentation of the DEM of
the Aral Sea area, is presented in an Albers projection in Figure 2.1 (Appendix C).
GTOPO30, a DEM distributed by the USGS (United States Geological Survey), is
a topographic surface arranged in a data file as a set of regularly-spaced x,y,z
locations where z represents elevation (ESRI, 1997). The DEM is the starting
point of any GIS based hydrologic modeling.  The DEM used for this analysis
consists of 6.4 million 30 by 30 minute cells, which are approximately equal to 1
kilometer between measured locations.
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Figure 2.1: Topographic map of the Aral Sea basin from the USGS 30" DEM,
GTOPO30.
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The methodology for delineating streams and watersheds from a raster
digital elevation model (DEM) is based on the eight direction pour-point
algorithm. This algorithm identifies the grid cell, out of the eight surrounding
cells, towards which water will flow if driven by gravity (Olivera, 1997). This
methodology consists of:
• Filling the sinks of the DEM, i.e., increasing the elevation of the points
that are fictitious depressions known as pits.
• Determining the flow direction, i.e., identifying the cell towards which
water will flow.
• Calculating the flow accumulation, i.e., evaluating the drainage area in
units of grid cells.
• Identifying the stream cells, i.e., identifying those cells with a flow
accumulation value greater than a certain user-defined threshold value.
• Labeling the links, i.e., assigning a label (number) to each reach of the
stream network.
• Delineating the watershed for each link, i.e., determining the
incremental drainage area associated with each link.
A delineation AML (Arc Macro Language Program) can be run "in the
background" in ArcInfo to determine the stream and watershed delineations from
the DEM.  This is convenient for large areas which usually require several hours
to be processed.  Commands for this AML can be found in Appendix D.  It should
be noted that watershed and stream delineation can also now be done in the
Spatial Analyst extension of ArcView 3.0.
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Inland Catchment
When the stream and network delineations for the Aral Sea Basin were
first made, shown in Figure 2.2, all the streams seemed to be flowing towards the
Caspian Sea rather than the Aral Sea. Therefore, an inland catchment AML,
which addresses the problem of inland catchments with Digital Elevation Models,
during watershed delineation was used (Appendix E).  Inland catchments
constitute closed hydrologic systems that do not drain to the ocean, as do most
watersheds.  In inland catchments, water drains towards an inland pour point
located within the basin, and not towards the basin border.
Figure 2.2: Original stream delineation for the Aral Sea basin.
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To guarantee that delineated streams match observed streams and flow
gauging stations, the DEM was corrected by increasing the elevation of all cells
except for the ones that coincide with the observed streams. This process is
equivalent to digging trenches wherever a stream has been observed. This
algorithm does not force the water to flow to the streams, but instead forces the
flow to remain in the streams once it gets there.
The difficulty in delineating inland catchments is that the standard
delineation procedure requires a depressionless DEM.  “Satisfying this
requirement guarantees that the water is able to flow along the landscape without
being trapped in depressions. The existence of DEM depressions is explained by
pits (DEM errors that might be small but critical for hydrologic modeling), and by
inland catchments (in which the lowest cell constitutes a pour point)” (Olivera,
1997).  Therefore, before delineating the streams, the DEM has to be corrected in
the following ways: (1) filling the pits (using the FILL function of Arc/Info-Grid),
(2) subtracting the original DEM from the filled DEM, and (3) assigning a
NODATA value to the lowest cell of the inland catchment (pour points).  The
Aral Sea was identified manually as the inland catchment.
Digital Chart of the World
The next step was to use the Digital Chart of the World (DCW) (ESRI,
1996) to get the streams of the region.  The gray lines in Figure 2.3 indicate the
thousands of streams which were taken from the DCW. The blue lines show the
streams that were selected from the DCW to be burned in the DEM.  This
19
burning-in process consists of raising the elevation of all the cells but those that
coincide with the digitized streams.  By doing this, water is forced to remain in
the streams once it gets there; however, it is not forced to flow towards them.
Extensive experience at the CRWR has shown that the streams delineated using
this improved methodology represent much better the real stream network than
the streams derived form the DEM alone. This process consists of:
• Converting the line coverage of digitized streams into a grid (with
value 1 in the stream cells and NODATA elsewhere).
• Making sure that this grid presents continuous streams (no gaps), does
not involve short circuits, and extends out of the study area.
• Adding a constant value to the DEM, 50000 in this case.
• Merging the two grids together, keeping the stream grid on top of the
modified elevation grid, to obtain the burned-DEM.
20
Figure 2.3: Streams of the Aral Sea basin from the Digital Chart of the World.
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Selecting arcs one by one to create this coverage took a very long time.
The task was made easier by looking at the streams surveyed by the European
Union TACIS Program coverage (Gunn, 1996). The EU TACIS Program
coverage, shown in Figure 2.4, was originally in a Transverse Mercator
projection, and therefore had to be converted from Transverse to Albers
(Appendix C). The final coverage of streams to be burned is showed in Figure
2.5.
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Figure 2. 4: European Union TACIS Program coverage of digitized streams of the
Aral Sea basin.
23
Figure 2.5: Aral Sea basin streams to be burned in.
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Watershed and Stream Delineation of Burned DEM
The DEM was “burned in” by setting the stream cells to zeros and
effectively burning in the streams.  ArcInfo LINEGRID was also used to rasterize
the digitized stream networks.  DEM’s usually contain sinks; A sink is a cell with
undefined drainage direction; all cells around it are higher.  For a hydrologic
DEM to be created, all the sinks in the burned DEM must be filled in.  By using
the Fill command in ArcInfo, all sinks which are lower than their lowest adjacent
neighbor will be filled to the height of their pour point.  The pour point is the
boundary cell with the lowest elevation for the contributing area of a sink.
Once the sinks have been filled, the flowdirection grid can be determined.
The ArcInfo Flowdirection function assigns to each cell a number corresponding
to which of the 8 neighbouring cell which lies on the path of steepest descent.
The cells flow to their nearest neighbour along 1 of 8 compass directions labeled
as East = 1, SE = 2, S = 4, SW=8, W=16, NW=32, N=64, NE=128.  The direction
of flow is determined by finding the direction of steepest descent from each cell.
The flowaccumulation is greater in the Amu Darya than in the Syr Darya, because
the area is greater in the Amu Darya.  The area of the Amu Darya basin is
847,000 square kilometers while the area of the Syr Darya is 370,000 square
kilometers; the entire watershed is equal to 1.217 million square kilometers.
Next a grid of the streams was created. Different results are obtained
depending on the threshold value of flow accumulation used.  The threshold is the
minimum area necessary to create a stream; in this case 3000 cells (3000 square
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kilometers) were used.  A higher threshold produces fewer streams than a lower
threshold.  Then, the watershed delineation was created by locating the outlet cell
at the bottom end of each watershed.  Figure 2.6 shows the delineated streams and
watersheds in an Albers Projection (Appendix C).  Using a threshold of 3000 gave
the best coverage in comparison to the EU TACIS Programme streams, shown in
Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.6: Stream and watershed delineation for the Aral Sea basin.
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of the GIS delineated and EU TACIS Program streams
for the Aral Sea basin.
Watershed Division
The Helsinki Rules list “ the extent of the watershed within each country”
as one of the 12 main topics to determine water rights.  The ArcInfo intersect
command was used to intersect the watershed coverage (Figure 2.6) with the
political country coverage (Figure 1.1) to determine the watershed extent of each
country.  The results are interesting.  Most of the Aral Sea basin lies within
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Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Kazakstan.  The extent of the Aral
Sea basin in China is minimal at 0.2%.  The pie chart in Figure 2.8 illustrates the
division of the basin more clearly.
Figure 2.8: Percent of Aral Sea basin in each country.
The calculated values were then compared to documented values of
watershed extent. The area of the Aral Sea basin referenced to January 1987 was
found in the Diagnostic Study for the Development of an Action Plan for the
Conservation of the Aral Sea (UNEP, 1991).  Table 2.1 shows the comparison
between the documented and calculated values.
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Table 2. 1: Comparison of the Computed and Documented Areas of the Aral Sea
Basin.
Table 2.1 indicates the utility and reliability of using GIS to delineate
watershed areas.  One should note that the calculated values for the two upstream
countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are lower than the documented values.
However, the calculated values for the downstream countries, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, are higher than the documented values.  In natural
circumstances the flow pattern of water cannot cross the borders of watersheds,
but in some watersheds water is not only flowing in a natural direction but it is
also diverted to other areas for irrigation, domestic use, and industrial use thereby
increasing the extent of the watershed  (Hoogeven, 1997).  In this case, GIS was




The soil water balance of the Aral Sea basin has been calculated before,
but never using GIS.  By determining the soil water balance in Central Asia, the
“contribution of water by each basin State” can be determined (Helsinki Rules).
The soil-water balance is a simple accounting scheme used to predict soil-water
storage, evaporation, and water surplus.  This section discusses the methodology
of adding snowmelt to the GIS soil water balance of the Aral Sea basin.
Input Data
In order to calculate a soil water budget of the area, data was obtained
from the Digital Atlas of the World Water Balance (CRWR, 1997).  The
DAWWB contains 30” by 30”cells of precipitation, temperature, water holding
capacity, and radiation data for the Earth.  This climatology is largely
representative of the years 1920 to 1980 with more weight given to recent ("data-
rich") years (Legates and Willmott, 1990).
Global estimates of "plant-extractable water capacity" have recently
become available on a 30 arcminute grid (Dunne and Willmott, 1996). As used in
the Digital Atlas of the World Water Balance, the term plant-extractable water
capacity is equivalent to water-holding capacity. One reason given for developing
this global database was to eliminate the need for assuming spatially invariant
plant-extractable water capacity in soil-water balance computations made over
large areas. Information about sand, clay, organic content, plant rooting depth,
and horizon thickness was used to estimate the plant-extractable water capacity.
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Figure 2.9 shows the soil water holding capacity in millimeters for the Aral Sea
basin.  The land nearest the rivers has a much higher water holding capacity.
Figure 2.9: Soil water holding capacity of the Aral Sea basin (mm).
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Figure 2.10 shows the average temperature in degrees Celsius for the area.
The temperature in the mountainous areas has an average annual value of less
than 0 degrees Celsius.  This means that there are only a few daily temperatures
above 0oC when snow could melt.  Meanwhile, the summer temperatures along
the Amu Darya are desert like.  Figure 2.11 shows the average annual net
radiation in watts per square meter in the Aral Sea basin. The data set includes
longwave and shortwave radiation flux estimates for a 96 month period extending
from July 1983 to June 1991.  Figure 2.12 shows the annual precipitation in
millimeters.  The region surrounding the Aral Sea receives very little precipitation
throughout the year.  The region surrounding the source of the rivers receives
higher precipitation, mostly in the form of snow.
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Figure 2.10: Average annual temperatures in the Aral Sea basin (oC).
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Figure 2.11: Mean monthly net radiation (W/m2).
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Figure 2.12: Mean annual precipitation in the Aral Sea basin (mm).
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Methodology for Calculating Snowmelt
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) have been used extensively to
study the spatial hydrology of regions.  It is only fitting that those hydrologic
studies be applied to political situations such as water disputes.  The amount of
water surplus produced by each country is an important hydrologic factor which
can be determined using GIS.  Several ArcView Avenue scripts were written at
the Center for Research in Water Resources (CRWR) to calculate water surplus
by Seann Reed.  However, these calculations did not include water surplus from
snow melt.
According to Aizen et al. (1996a) about 1,580 cubic kilometers of fresh
water is stored in the central Asian glaciers.  On average, glacial runoff is 10.3%
of total runoff at the mouth of mountain valleys.  This proportion of runoff
decreases to 9.5% in wet years, and increases to 19.5% in drought years.  It is
therefore important to determine how to calculate runoff from snow melt for this
study region.
Willmott et al. (1985) discussed the subject of water budgeting. The daily
snow melt in millimeters per day is taken as
Melt = 2.63 + 2.55 (temp) + 0.0912(temp)(rain) (2.1)
This equation was fitted to three dissimilar drainage basins and 113 daily
observations.  Whitlock et al. (1985) estimate that the energy required to
evaporate 1 mm/day of water is about 30 W/m2.  If energy is needed to evaporate
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water, it can also be said that energy is needed to produce snow melt.  However,
Willmott et al. (1985) keep their equation for snow melt simplified by not
introducing radiation into the equation.
There are two methods for calculating snowmelt according to Brubaker
and Rango (1996), the simple temperature-index or the slightly more complex
temperature and radiation.  For the temperature-radiation approach, the general
orientation of the hillslope is a major factor in the amount of solar radiation
received, thereby further dividing the basin into "aspect/elevation zones".  In the
temperature version, the basin is "subdivided into elevation zones", where the
lapse rate applied to a base-station temperature is used to obtain daily-average
temperatures for the zone.
Brubaker and Rango (1996) discuss the development of the Snowmelt
Runoff Model, which uses a temperature-index approach to melt snow from a
basin’s elevation zones.  Air temperature is noted as being the best single
meteorological variable for predicting snowmelt. Aizen et al. (1996b) state that air
temperature alone can also be used a s a predictor of snow and ice melt in the
Northern Tien Shan.
Brubaker et al. (1996) state that snowmelt forecasting models need to at
minimum incorporate snowcover extent information, which is currently obtained
operationally.  This may create problems for large basins, and it is therefore
concluded that the less data intensive temperature index models should be used
for basins greater than 122,000 square kilometers.
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In Brubaker et al. (1996), daily snowmelt is calculated according to the
following equation
Melt = mQ Rd + ar Td (2.2)
where mQ [(cm/day)( W/m2)] is a physical constant converting  energy to
water mass or depth, Rd (W/m2) is the net radiation index, ar (cm/day/
oC) is the
restricted degree-day coefficient (the product of degree-day coefficient and
degree-day index), and Td (
oC) is the degree-day index.  The basin is subdivided
into elevation zones, and a lapse rate is applied to base-station temperatures in
order to obtain daily-average temperatures for zones.
A precipitation module may also be used, along with temperature, to
distinguish between the altitudes with snow and those with rain.  In Brubaker et
al. (1996)’ s example, precipitation is labeled as snow for temperatures below
0.75 degrees Celsius.
Anderson (1976) recommends that snowmelt index models should keep
the number of indices to a minimum, because of interrelationships between the
indices. He concludes that the radiation and temperature indices are correlated,
owing to the physical cause and effect relationships between net radiation and
surface and air temperature.
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Calculating Snowmelt
Soil water balancing refers to the partitioning of precipitation into
evaporation, runoff and recharge using a water balance calculation applied to a
volume of soil.  A series of GIS computation scripts and exercises to determine
the soil water balance have been developed and applied to the Aral Sea basin
(Reed, 1997).
The soil-water budget is a simple accounting scheme used to predict soil-
water storage, evaporation, and water surplus.  Surplus is the fraction of
precipitation that exceeds potential evapotranspiration and is not stored in the soil.
The simple model used here does not distinguish between surface and subsurface
runoff, so surplus includes both.  The main purpose of calculating the water
budget is to estimate surplus, which serves as input to groundwater and surface
water flow models. With this in mind, the basic equation for calculating surplus
is:
S = P- E - ∆w/∆t (2.3)
where S is surplus (mm/mo), P is precipitation (mm/mo), E is evaporation
(mm/yr), w is soil moisture (mm), and t is time (mo). Horizontal motion of water
on the land surface or in the soil is not considered by this model.
The work of Reed (1997) did not include snowmelt in the water balance
computations because temperatures throughout the study  used remain above
freezing throughout the year.  In the Aral Sea basin, the average annual
40
temperatures can be as low as –1 C.  It is therefore very important to incorporate
snowmelt into the soil water balance computations.  This has been accomplished
with an enhanced version of Reed's ArcView scripts using Fortran (Appendix F).
The first step of calculating snowmelt is to determine whether
precipitation was snow or rain. Accruing to Willmott and Dogg, snowmelt is
equal to the following:
melt = 2.63 + 2.55 (temp) + 0.0912(temp)(rain) (2.4)
where melt is snowmelt (mm/day), temp is temperature (oC), and rain is
non-ice precipitation (mm/mo).  Precipitation partitions into rain and snow over
the range from -1 to 4 degrees Celsius with essentially all precipitation being rain
above 4 and all snow below -1 and in between a mixture of the two (Maidment,
1993).  The snow budget was therefore run for two temperatures: 2oC and 0oC.
The snow storage, Equation 2.5, at any time is equal to the snow storage at the
time before plus the fallen snow within that time period minus the snowmelt, and
the snow storage must always be equal or greater than zero:
sstori+1 = sstori + snow – melt (2.5)
If sstori+1 ≤ 0
sstori+1 = 0
where sstor is snow storage (mm/day), sstori+1 is the snow storage




The input data needed for the soil water balance are the monthly
temperature, radiation, water holding capacity and precipitation grids obtained
from the Digital Atlas of the World Water Balance, and the geographic extent of
the watershed. The Priestley-Taylor method is used to calculate the potential
evaporation and then the soil moisture balance is calculated.  The final
evaporation values for the area can be seen Figure 2.13.
As can be expected, the evaporation upstream in mountainous areas is
low, while the evaporation values are high in the low plains. Some of the values
in the mountain ranges have a negative evaporation.  This is due to the area being
covered with rock or ice. The Avenue program does not include equations for
calculating evaporation with negative soil water holding capacities.
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Figure 2.13: Annual evaporation in the Aral Sea basin (mm/yr).
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Figure 2.14 shows the annual water surplus before the snowmelt
component was added.  Figure 2.15 shows the annual water surplus after the
snowmelt component was added.  This analysis was run using snow forming at
temperatures lower than 2oC.  The water surplus using the snowmelt program is
higher.  Most of the snowmelt became runoff either because the soil was already
saturated or because there is no soil at high altitudes, thereby increasing the water
surplus.  A few cells, shown in dark red, have extremely high surplus values
because their soil water holding capacity is –10 (vegetation is absent i.e. rock) or
–990 (indicates ice).  The evaporation for these cells is calculated to equal zero,
thereby giving extremely high water surpluses.  Figure 2.16 shows the annual
water surplus when snow is produced at 0oC.
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Figure 2.14: Annual water surplus in the Aral Sea basin without snowmelt
(mm/yr).
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Figure 2.15: Annual water surplus in the Aral Sea basin with snowmelt at 2oC
(mm/yr).
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Figure 2.16: Annual water surplus in the Aral Sea basin with snowmelt at 0oC
(mm/yr).
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The water surplus values differ for precipitation as rain, and for
precipitation as snow and rain (Table 2.2).  China’s waters surplus differs by five
times if snowmelt is calculated.  The surplus for other countries differs by as
much as 65%.  When snow melts, the ground is usually already saturated, thereby
giving higher surpluses when snow is considered separately than rain.   However,
the difference between water surplus from snowmelt at 2oC and 0oC are very
slight and differ by less than 1 %.









no snow snow at 2C snow at 0C
(mm/yr) (mm/yr) (mm/yr) (mm/yr)
Kyrgyzstan 335 16 46 46
Kazakstan 267 12 31 31
Tajikistan 259 106 51 51
Turkmenistan 211 8 18 18
Uzbekistan 255 12 29 29
Afganistan 326 60 78 78
Iran 253 10 30 30
China 132 173 25 25
Figure 2.17 displays the results for the water surplus more clearly.  The
upstream countries produce more surplus from a smaller amount of precipitation
than the downstream countries.  This is caused by most of the precipitation in the
upstream countries (mountains) not infiltrating into the soil as does the
precipitation in the downstream countries (valleys and plains).  The water
surpluses for Tajikistan, Afganistan and China when snowmelt is not computed
are 5 to 17 times higher than the surpluses for the other countries.  This
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demonstrates the necessity for differentiating between snow and rain, and for
calculating snowmelt.  Figure 2.17 and Table 2.2 clearly show that the water
surplus calculated with snowmelt is the better representative of water surplus for
regions with high mountains and cold climates.
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Because the Helsinki Rules list water contribution as one of the factors in
determining water rights, it is important to establish where the surplus originates.
Figure 2.18 is a pie chart which shows where water originates for water surplus
with snowmelt. Afganistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan are the countries that
produce the most surplus.  It should be noted that the surplus values for the
mountainous areas may be slightly erroneous due to false evaporation values.
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Figure 2.18: Pie chart for percent of annual water surplus for each Aral Sea













Chapter 3: Social and Economic Study
There are three main factors dominating the complicated social and
economic situation in the Aral Sea basin: the legacy of the past, the new political
independence of each state, and the varying degrees of movement toward market-
oriented economies (World Bank, 1996). Independence from the Soviet Union has
brought the prospect of greater national-sufficiency and governance, while at the
same time contributing to a decline in economic integration among the former
republics of the USSR.  Since becoming independent, each state has experienced
high inflation, credit shortages and declines in the gross domestic product (GDP).
However badly the economy has suffered, the levels of literacy, education and
technical expertise have remained high.
The Helsinki Rules state that all factors in determining water rights must
be weighed equally.  Therefore, the economy and society of each Central Asian
country must be analyzed in respect to their dependence on the Aral Sea waters.
Chapter 3 is an in depth look at the economic and social problems each country
faces.  Chapter 4 addresses the matter of how to share the waters without hurting





As of 1993, the population of Kazakstan was 17 million with a territory of
2.7 million square kilometers.  Almost 3 million people live in the 302,000 square
kilometers of Kazakstan’s portion of the Aral Sea basin, the South Kazakstan and
Kyzylorda oblasts.  Kazakstan is a country of vast spaces and natural contrasts
(Figure 3.1). When apricot trees start blossoming and grain is being sown in warm
soil in the south, blizzards may be raging in the north of the country. The severe
cold of Siberia and the oppressive heat of Asia, the taiga (coniferous forests) and
steppe lands, vast lowlands and steep mountain ridges all meet on the territory of
Kazakstan.
Almaty, or Alma-Ata, the capital of the Kazakstan, is situated in the
southeastern part of the country at the foot of the Zailiski Ala-Tau mountain
system.  It is called a garden city.  The word "Almaty" in Kazakh means "grown
with apple trees", and "Alma -Ata" means "Apple Father".  Almaty has a
population of 1.3 million.  Founded more than 130 years ago, this city is the
youngest among the capitals of the world.  However, the capital is in the process
of being moved to the North of the country away from China and potentially
hostile neighbors.
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Figure 3. 1: Location of Kazakstan.
Covering a big territory, Kazakstan is one of the most sparsely populated
countries in the world, 6.1 persons per square kilometer.  There are 16.5 million
inhabitants in Kazakstan today, Kazaks and Russians being the two ethnic
majorities (Table 3. 1). Nearly 56% of the people live in towns and workers’
settlements, the rest are the rural population (Kazakstan, 1997).
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History
Administered as part of the Central Asia under the tsars, after the
Bolshevik revolution Kazakstan became an Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic (ASSR) within the Soviet Union.  It did not achieve full republic status
until 1936, and its borders continued to be shifted until the 1960s.   Kazakstan
was the last of the former Soviet republics to declare independence in December
1991 (Olcott, 12).
Kazakstan is a constitutional republic with a strong presidency.
Throughout most of 1995, Kazakstan had no legislature; the country was
governed through decree by the President and the Cabinet of Ministers. President
Nursultan Nazarbayev, initially elected in 1991 to a five-year term as President, is
the country’s central political figure. In April 1995, his term was extended by
referendum to the year 2000. A new constitution was adopted, also by
referendum, in August 1995, that concentrates power in the presidency,
permitting it to dominate the parliament, judiciary and local government.
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The President is the head of state.  He is also the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces and may veto legislation that has been passed by the parliament.
The Prime Minister, who serves at the pleasure of the President, chairs the
Cabinet of Ministers and serves as Kazakstan’s head of government. There are
several deputy prime ministers (the number is not fixed), 20 ministers, and 19
chairmen of state committees.
Kazakstan has a bicameral parliament, comprised of a lower house (the
Majilis) and upper house (the Senate). Forty members of the Senate are indirectly
elected by members of the regional assemblies; the remaining seven senators are
appointed by the President. The 67-seat Majilis is popularly-elected. The
December 1995 parliamentary elections were considered to have been an
important, albeit flawed, step on Kazakstan’s road to democracy. Majilis deputies
and the government both have the right of legislative initiative. In September
1996, Majilis deputies, for the first time, proposed several draft laws; prior to that
time, all legislation considered by the parliament had been proposed by the
government.  Political parties in Kazakstan are generally small and nearly
unknown outside of the major cities. There are six political parties officially
represented in the Kazakstani parliament. Three of these parties - the Party of
People’s Unity, the Democratic Party, and the People’s Cooperative Party - are
pro-presidential. Two small opposition parties, the separatist and the communist
parties, have seats in parliament. Outside of parliament, small Kazak ethnic and
Slavic ethnic parties are active in some cities. Party affiliations play little role in
local Kazakstani politics, where personal and family ties are more important.
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Citizens enjoy basic rights to free speech, press and assembly; however,
some rights are restricted by complicated bureaucratic requirements and an
imperfect legal system. The government generally respects the human rights of its
citizens.  Citizens may therefore add pressure on the government to put
restrictions on water use and install better techniques for water irrigation in order
to save the Aral Sea.  The health of Kazakstan’s population is completely affected
by the water pollution and salt storms, and therefore citizens may voice their
concern for solving this problem.  Furthermore, citizen’s inputs into the planning
process of water management could be important in developing sustainable water
management.
Economic Needs
Six years ago, with the Soviet Union disintegrating around it, the Republic
of Kazakstan literally discovered itself as an independent country. Since declaring
independence on October 25, 1991, this Central Asian state has crafted the
mechanisms and policies of a sovereign nation, paying specific attention to
attracting foreign investment in its oil and gas sectors. Kazakstan today appears
the most politically stable of the Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union.
Kazakstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev is widely viewed as an effective
leader and reliable partner. By moving cautiously on the economic and political
fronts, he has been able to avoid the doomsday scenarios of ethnic conflict,
economic collapse, and renewed domination by Moscow. In achieving this
stability, Kazakstan has attracted roughly $46 billion in foreign investment since
independence, $9.5 billion more than Russia.
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To its credit, since 1991 Kazakstan has been able to establish its statehood
and national identity while coping with monumental problems associated with its
Soviet legacy. These include environmental and public health crises from nuclear
testing and a multi-ethnic population in which ethnic Kazaks formed only a
plurality, not a majority, in their own country. The country also inherited a
distorted economy heavily integrated with Russia but managed to solicit foreign
investment and diversify by direct participation in the global economy.
The Kazakstani banking system is currently in a state of transition, and is
trying to adopt Western banking standards. In the period 1993 to 1996, the
number of commercial banks was halved, chiefly by failures, to just under 100.
Local citizens are wary of the reliability of Kazakstani banks, as well as wary of
tax authorities, and generally keep their savings at home. Kazakstani banks offer
loans at prohibitively high interest rates, which often frustrate small, developing
entrepreneurs. The volume of lending is low. The undercapitalization of
Kazakstani banks means that they do not have the ability to finance major
projects. Loans from Kazakstani banks carry a very high interest rate, often 20%
higher than the refinancing rate. These high rates are set partly because the rates
lag behind falling inflation and partly because the banks are trying to compensate
for losses from past bad loans. The official National Bank of Kazakstan
refinancing rate as of January 1997 was 35%, down from a high of 300% in
March 1994 (BISNIS, 1997).
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Social Needs
The transition of sovereign Kazakstan to a market economy has been
accompanied by a production crisis and an unprecedented deterioration of the
social sphere. The living standards of a significant portion of the population are
declining, the material conditions of different groups are becoming polarized, and
social services, especially in the sphere of public health care, are shrinking. The
latter is due most of all to the state budget deficit and cuts in allocations for health
services, which amount to a 40% drop in real terms (UNHDP, 1996).
As for the education sector, the overall picture has been one of decline.
State expenditures for education were 55% lower in 1995 than in 1993. State
funding for pre-schools is ending, with the result that between 1991 and 1995 half
of all kindergartens and day nurseries were closed down. To compensate, private
funding is being mobilized. Major education reforms are under way to improve
school facilities, to revise curricula, and to reduce dependency on Russian-
produced text books; but funding is still a major problem. Nevertheless, past
achievements in the educational sphere mean that the country’s educational level
is still high, especially with regard to the literacy rate and average years of
schooling.
The last stage of settlement on the territory of Kazakstan in the early
1990’s was characterized by rapid growth of towns and cities as well as of the
population itself, and explosive development of industrial potential in the most
densely populated regions. One of the main consequences of the transition process
has been a fall in the birth rate due to curtailment of third and subsequent births.
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Another consequence has been rising mortality due to circulatory disease,
accidents, murder and suicide, and cancer. Together these resulted in the decline
of absolute natural growth from 256,100 per year in 1989 to 145,800 per year in
1994, a 43% fall. There has also been a substantial net emigration, mainly of
Russians, Germans and Ukrainians.
The process of urbanization has resulted in a critical ecological situation in
the principal regions where industrial development and population growth
occurred. The most dangerous manifestations of this crisis are pollution of limited
water resources and the atmosphere, degradation of the soil and vegetation,
deforestation, extensive desertification, radiation pollution, and dangerous natural
disaster situations such as the Aral Sea crisis. The Aral Sea ecological disaster
zone caused by the drying up of this sea also has major consequences for the
population of the area (oblasts near the Syr Darya) in terms of employment and
health. On the other hand, the rise in the level of the Caspian Sea is also a major
threat to the environment, and it is anticipated that it will flood 3 million hectares
of Kazakstani pasture lands, towns and cities and industrial complexes.
The Aral Sea’s contaminated with agricultural runoff containing salts,
pesticides, and fertilizer residues have been the cause of many diseases.  Only
about 10% of potable drinking water requirements, where approximately 30 liters
per day are considered required for basic human needs, area available in rural
areas near the Aral Sea.  The incidence of typhoid and hepatitis in the oblasts
bordering the sea are five times the average for all of Kazakstan.
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Qyzylorda, a region of Kazakstan bordering the Aral Sea, has an 84%
greater death rate than the rest of Kazakstan; death caused by diseases of the
circulatory system are 74% higher, diseases of the respiratory system are 148%
higher, and malignant neoplasms are 72% higher in Qyzylorda than the rest of
Kazakstan  (Anderson, 1997).  From 1985 to 1994, the rate of spontaneous
abortions (miscarriages) in Qyzylorda has increased by 70%.  In the districts of
Aral and Kazalinsk Rayon, spontaneous abortions rates are 2 times higher than
the birth rates.
 Despite the decline in industrial production, and measures taken to protect
water supplies, the level of pollution in reservoirs remains high. Construction of
treatment works for the Irtysh River remains unfinished because of lack of funds.
In addition, the capacities of existing purification plants for sewage in many
oblasts cannot keep up with the volumes of water to be treated. Industrial waste
from the mining industry currently amounts to 19 billion tons. Furthermore, only
6 to 7% of the one billion tons produced annually, are recycled, compared to the
corresponding figure for developed countries of 40 to 50%.
The rapid rate and wide extent of impoverishment in Kazakstan has had a
number of specific effects: The formerly low-income segments of the population
(pensioners, the disabled, large families, unmarried mothers, people without a
wage-earner in the household, etc.) have all become extremely poor and are now
on the verge of destitution.
Most of the population (64 %) are living near or below the minimum
subsistence level.  Rural areas are serious concentration points for poverty.  At
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present 84% of the rural population have incomes below the minimum
subsistence level defined by the state Statistical Committee.  Agriculture, which
employs the rural population, also employs 44% of the workforce.  Therefore, the
status as living below the poverty line of 37% of Uzbekistan’s population is
dependent on the Syr Darya.  Unemployment has increased, and 70 % of the
registered unemployed are workmen.  Workers at industrial enterprises are
experiencing great suffering. Many of them are on forced leaves or part-time
schedules due to the absence of material resources and power, customer
insolvency and lack of sales markets. State employees are in very serious need.
Teachers, doctors and state white-collar personnel are the lowest paid; their
salaries are a mere 40 % of the republican average. The poverty of all state
employees is aggravated by constant delays in salary and pension payments. In
March 1996, salary arrears equaled 2.7 times the state’s entire monthly payroll,
fund, and unpaid pensions amounted to 1.5 times the size of social benefits. New
kinds of poor people have appeared: Refugees number approximately 150,000;
the number of homeless people and drifters cannot even be estimated.
The United Nations Development Programme Human Development
Report Office urges the Kazakstani government to determine which of the above
groups have the highest priority, based on the gravity of their situations and the
existing resources. It also urges the preparation of a clearly defined national
poverty reduction strategy, made up of mid-term and long-term measures, and on
the basis of models of economic growth which reflect flexible micro-economic
policy. These models should have a multi-sectoral approach and must not
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concentrate only on privileges and benefits. Economic methods of encouraging
private initiatives, a reliable system of poverty monitoring, the participation of
civil society, and greater regional independence in decision-making should also
be included (UNHDP, 1996).
Dependence on Aral Sea Basin
A total of 44% of Kazakstan’s 17 million population depends on
agriculture as a source of employment.  Currently 2.6 million Kazakstanis, hence
15% of the total population, live in the Aral Sea Basin (South Kazakstan and Kyzl
Orda Oblasts) and more than 30% of the GDP is from agriculture.  Kazkastan
diverts 9.4 cubic kilometers of water per year from the Syr Darya and the Kirov
Canal.  The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC), founded in
1992 to prevent conflicts in water distribution, and to manage the Syr Darya and
Amu Darya, allocates 8.4 cubic kilometers of water per year to Kazakstan (World
Bank, 1996).
In order to receive a critical 3.25 cubic kilometers of water yearly from the
Toktogul Reservoirs and 1.1 billion kilowatt hour of hydroelectric power during
the summer months, Kazakstan provides Kyrgyzstan with 1.1 billion kilowatt
hours of electricity in the form of coal or electricity.  These summer water
releases are used to irrigate 302,000 square kilometers of  Kazakstani land (Keith
and McKinney, 1997).
Availability of Resources
Kazakstan has substantial oil, natural gas and coal reserves and major
agricultural resources.  It possesses immense mineral wealth and it is a major
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producer of iron ore and a variety of non-ferrous metals (chromite, copper, zinc,
and lead). Uranium is mined and processed, and nuclear research facilities and
test sites are located in Kazakstan (in 1995 the republic completed its process of
nuclear disarmament). Parts of Kazakstan are highly industrialized and factories
are involved in the transformation of raw materials, including metal processing,
fuel, power, chemicals, machine building, textiles, and food processing.
Kazakstan is highly dependent on trade with Russia, and exchanges natural
resources for finished consumer and industrial goods.  The main agricultural crops
are fruits, sugar beet, vegetables, potatoes, cotton and cereals, and livestock
breeding and wool producing are also important. Over-intensive farming has
resulted in the degradation of arable land.
The oil and gas industry is the most rapidly developing sector in
Kazakstan. The country’s proven oil reserves are 15.5 billion barrels, but potential
reserves under the Caspian Sea could be enormous - perhaps more than 30 billion
barrels. Estimates of natural gas reserves range from three to six trillion cubic
meters. Current annual production is roughly 189 million barrels of oil and six
billion cubic meters of natural gas. Kazakstan hopes to produce 630 million
barrels of oil per year by 2005 and 950 million barrels by 2020 (BISNIS, 1997).
To encourage foreign investment, Kazakstan has recently enacted a new tax code,
established a new currency, the tenge, and stepped up efforts to stabilize its
economy. Anxious to develop its vast resources, the government is also mindful
of its environmental responsibility.
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Oil production increased during the first nine months of 1996, reportedly
reaching its 1993 level of 190 million barrels per year. Production during this
period was 16 % higher than over the same period of 1995. Natural gas
production also has grown, climbing nearly 27 % in the first three quarters of
1996 compared to the same period of 1995. The Energy Information
Administration (EIA) of the Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that
Kazakstan has proven reserves of 14 billion barrels of oil and 26 trillion cubic feet
(tcf) of natural gas. One of the problems hobbling Kazakstan’s economic recovery
is the debt burden between enterprises - well over one billion dollars.  The debt
problem is particularly acute in the energy sector, with many private and
commercial customers unable to pay for energy supplies. While officially
recorded unemployment remains low, this masks a high level of hidden
unemployment - perhaps close to 10 to 15%.  By 1995, real domestic product had
contracted to only 47% of its 1990 level.  However, according to the government
of Kazakstan, the steep decline in production finally may have bottomed out.
GDP increased modestly in 1996 and is expected to grow by 2% in 1997. Western
observers and international financial institutions concur with this view (BISNIS,
1997).
In 1995, Kazakstan’s total energy production (66.7 billion kWh) was
roughly comparable to production levels of the early 1980’s. Energy consumption
per person in 1995 was 4,424 kWh (1990 - 6,255 kWh). About 80% of
Kazakstani energy is generated by coal-fired power stations. There are 54 coal-
fired power stations, five hydro-electric power stations and one Caspian seashore-
66
based nuclear power station in Kazakstan. The Kazakstani power transmission
and distribution system is linked to two separate networks: the Russian network in
the north and the Central Asian system in the south. Although Kazakstan exports
some of its electrical energy, it also imports approximately 30% of its electricity
requirements. The vast majority of Kazakstani power generating equipment is
out-of-date and in poor repair. Ninety-four  % of Kazakstan’s gas turbines, 57% of
its steam turbines, and 33% of its steam boilers have been in use for at least 20
years. Kazakstan has traditionally used Russian-made equipment, and there is
little Western-made heavy electrical equipment. The loss of energy during
transmission and distribution is another serious problem. In 1995, energy losses
reached 10.1 billion kWh, or 15.2% of energy produced.  With most Kazakstani
enterprises in financial difficulty, utility companies are rarely paid. In May 1995,
debts to utilities exceeded 55 billion tenge (approximately $833 million) (BISNIS,
1997).
Kazakstan boasts one-third of the world’s chromium and manganese
deposits.  Kazakstan also has substantial reserves of other minerals: 50% of the
former Soviet Union’s tungsten and lead, 40% of its zinc and copper, and 25% of
its bauxite, silver and phosphorus. Kazakstan is also the largest producer among
the Newly Independent States (NIS) of beryllium, tantalum, barite, uranium,
cadmium, and arsenic. There is good gold mining potential in Kazakstan.  More
than half of Kazakstani mining, processing, and smelting enterprises have
outdated equipment in need of repair. Most lack environmentally-friendly
technologies. Kazakstan does not have its own indigenous mining manufacturing
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industry, and is thus largely reliant on imports of mining machinery, mainly from
Russia (BISNIS, 1997).
 The importance of the Kazakh mining industry to the former Soviet
Union is well documented. Approximately 30% of copper, 64% of lead, 46% of
zinc and 99 % of chromite for the Soviet economy was produced in Kazakstan.
However, the gold mining industry, particularly primary deposits and the
production of dorè, was badly neglected under the Soviet centrally planned
economy which instead concentrated investment in gold production in Siberia and
northeastern Russia. Therefore, despite a long tradition of geological exploration
identified numerous deposits, Kazakstan now lacks the capital to develop a gold
industry and is actively seeking assistance from Western industrialized countries
in the form of investment, technology and training. The Kazak Government
appreciates the need to establish a competitive fiscal and legal framework to
compete for foreign investment and is reportedly committed to making Kazakstan
first among the emerging market economies in the competition for foreign
investment. The progressive attitude of the Kazakh Government is best illustrated
by the new "Gold Law" signed by President Nazarbayev on July 20, 1995 which
permits the export of physical gold from Kazakstan. Western companies provided






Uzbekistan, 447,400 square kilometers of territory (see Figure 3. 2), is at
the center of Central Asia’s transportation and power systems. About three-fifths
of Uzbekistan's land area is desert steppe broken by irrigated, fertile oases along
the banks of two great rivers, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Uzbekistan has cold
winters and averages no more than 8 inches of rainfall a year, but its hot, dry
summers, extending from May through October, and water for irrigation, create
excellent growing conditions for warm weather crops such as cotton, tobacco,
fruits, and vegetables.
Uzbekistan has a population of 22 million people and Tashkent, located at
the foothills of the Tien Shan Mountains, is the capital. Uzbek is the official state
language, though Russian is as commonly spoken. Tajik is also the common
language among persons of that nationality (Roy, 1997).
Tashkent has a population of 2 million people and another 4 million
people live in the surrounding areas. The Tashkent region also contains the
country's most advanced manufacturing, nonferrous metallurgy and energy
processing facilities, serviced by a highly educated workforce trained at nearby
universities and vocational institutions.
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Figure 3.2: Location of Uzbekistan.
The fertile Ferghana Valley, the odd shaped tail projecting eastward from
the main body of the country, contains six million people, including large
minorities of ethnic Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Russians (Table 3.2).  The Ferghana
Valley produces a major share of the country’s cotton and grain crops and also has
numerous manufacturing plants, as well as natural gas and oil fields.  The valley
extends into parts of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic which are economically
integrated with Uzbekistan and have large Uzbek minorities (Roy, 1997).
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Uzbekistan’s central region consists mostly of desert, broken by the oases
of the Zarafshan River, Qarshi Steppe, and Sukhandarya River. This region is best
known for the ancient "silk road" cities of Samarkand and Bukhara which
together claim more than 600,000 inhabitants and comprise the heart of
Uzbekistan’s tourism industry. Central Uzbekistan is also home to the mining
center of Navoi and contains the majority of Uzbekistan’s gold and other mineral
deposits, as well as the largest natural gas and oil fields. Irrigation along the Amu
Darya, Zarafshan and other rivers also provides a basis for agriculture.
In western Uzbekistan lie the ecologically damaged Aral Sea delta and the
vast deserts which characterize the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan.
Overuse of the rivers which feed the sea has already reduced it to two-thirds its
former size and salinization of the area around the sea threatens the environmental
and economic viability of a region in which a million people live. Blowing sand
and salt from the dry beds surrounding the Aral Sea has the potential to dessicate
agricultural areas downwind.
Despite Uzbekistan’s rich natural resources and a skilled labour force, by
the end of the 1980’s, per capita income, labour productivity, and real wages
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experienced a decline. Since 1991, reforms were initiated to reverse these trends
and overcome their disruption caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union. The
initial stages of reform have generated high social costs, but the government took
the view that for reforms to succeed, it was necessary to reduce these high social
costs.  A decline in inflation has helped to stabilize incomes and the real value of
social subsidies. Equally, special programmes undertaken by the government have
helped to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates and produce an increase in
life expectancy.
History
Russian military conquest of Uzbekistan began in 1865 and continued
until the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) was formed in 1924 from the
former Turkestan ASSR and the Khiva and Bukhara people’s republics.  In 1925,
the Uzbeks SSR was accepted into the USSR.  The Republic of Uzbekistan
proclaimed its independence on August 31, 1991 (Infopedia, 1996).  Islam
Karimov, the former head of Uzbekistan’s Communist Party, was first elected
President by Uzbekistan's Supreme Soviet in 1990 and later won a popular
election in 1991. He now holds the leading post in the ruling People's Democratic
Party (PDP) as well. On March 26, 1995 Karimov held a nationwide referendum
to extend his presidential term until the year 2000 which officially passed with
over 99% of the vote. Professing allegiance to what he terms "eastern
democracy", Karimov has stressed the importance of political stability over
Western-style democratic reforms. Although officially a multiparty system, the
principal opposition groups including the Erk (Freedom) Democratic Party, the
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Birlik (Unity) People’s Movement (BPM) and the Islamic Renaissance Party
(IRP) have been unable to register. The People’s Democratic Party, government
officials and a number of pro-government groups such as the Social Democratic
Party Adolat (Justice) and the Vatan Taraqqieti (Fatherland Progressive) Party
hold all the seats in the parliament (Oliy Majlis) (BISNIS, 1997).
Uzbekistan occupies a pivotal position in Central Asia: its frontiers are
shared with Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but no great
power, neither Russia nor China is a direct neighbor.  Uzbekistan clearly detached
itself from Moscow by being the only Central Asian state not to be occupied by a
Russian military base. Islam Karimov has always refused to put Uzbekistan's
frontier with Afganistan under CIS military protection.  Instead, Uzbekistan's
modest army of 35,000, where officers of Russian descent have been drastically
reduced, protects the borders (Chetarian, 1997).
Economic Needs
In 1995, Uzbekistan achieved considerable success in macroeconomic
stabilization. Measures taken by the government helped slow down the decline in
production, led to a noticeable decrease in the inflation rate, encouraged
investment, and contributed to the maintenance of a low state budget deficit.
Institutional reforms and policies directed toward priority areas also helped to
foster positive results, particularly in the oil, gas, and agricultural sectors. A
substantial part of Uzbekistan's success derives from the government's
macroeconomic policies. Unlike the governments of many CIS countries, the
Uzbek government has rejected the shock-therapy approach. Instead it has
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followed a slower, more cautious and balanced approach, so that the short - term
goals of stabilization have not been so rigidly pursued as to strangle any potential
for economic growth.
Taking 1990 as a base year, economic decline in Uzbekistan has been
relatively moderate. Its level of GDP in 1995 was only 18.2% lower than its 1990
level. This contrasts with the dramatic drops in GDP (between 40 and 60%) that
have occurred in surrounding CIS countries. The biggest drop in Uzbekistan’s
GDP occurred in 1992, when it fell by about 11 %. In comparison, the fall in 1995
was only 1.2%.
At the same time, the goal of limiting budget deficits to less than 3.5% of
GDP has been achieved, and the government has also succeeded in directing 40 -
50 % of previous social cost allocations to current social needs. The proportion of
the budget allocated to investment has increased from 3.9% of GDP (10.4% of
total expenditures) in 1994 to 6.7% of GDP (18.4% of total expenditures) in 1995.
Thus the current policy, combined with a functioning state apparatus, has helped
to maintain and stimulate production growth in some sectors. This includes not
only agriculture, but also energy and power, chemicals and petrochemicals,
mechanical engineering, and metal-working. Moreover, the average monthly rate
of inflation has decreased considerably and totaled only 6.7% in 1995 compared
with almost 24.5% in 1994.
A substantial portion of the Uzbek population lives and works in rural
areas.  Forty five percent of the population work in the agriculture sector, while
55% of the population live in rural areas.  Problems of excess labour supply in
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rural areas have existed for some time and remain a priority issue in the country’s
economic reform.  Compulsory employment, which occurred under the Soviet
regime, was not conducive to improving human development or stimulating
economic growth.  At the same time, this policy did not create sufficient
employment opportunities in regions with labour surplus, such as the Central
Asian republics.  The state artificially created the conditions for employment by
encouraging the rural population to grow cotton. Visible unemployment did not
exist because all individuals worked as collective farmers or employees of the
sovkhozes.  Low levels of labour productivity and incomes resulted from this
policy. Since transition, the Government has tackled employment problems in
conjunction with economic reform efforts, and the measures adopted have helped
to generate employment opportunities, alleviate the threat of mass unemployment
and decreasing individual dependency on the state.  The drying out of the Aral
Sea has caused further harm to the rural population’s employment rates.
However, for the period between 1996 and 2000, about two million new jobs will
need to be created, and more than 950,000 people will need to be trained or
retrained.
Social Needs
The reduction in state budgets for social services of health and education
has had a critical effect on the level of services, causing most funds to be directed
towards maintaining only minimal levels of health care. To offset reductions in
state financing, non-governmental financing has increased, and a network of self-
financing medical establishments has emerged, as well as pharmacies and clinics.
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Furthermore, new mechanisms are being sought for health care financing reform,
including through private insurance. While state funds continue to provide well
over 80% of all health financing, the portion of health care financed by private
means increased from 1.5% in 1990 to 5.8% in 1995, while the share of the total
national budget devoted to health increased from 8.6% to 10.5% in 1994, largely
for salaries.
In the education sector, despite limited budgets, the government is
carrying out an ambitious programme to restructure the educational system, to
train more teachers, to produce more text books, and to overcome the shortage of
financing, by shifting part of educational financing away from the state budget to
enterprises and students.
The development of an industrial society, a larger population, and greater
affluence, have intensified pressure on the environment.  Households now use far
more energy from non-renewable resources in the form of electricity, gas,
petroleum and other fuels compared to the Soviet era. Use of these resources has
lowered the air quality. Household garbage today contains far more non-
biodegradable materials than in the past, and re-usable waste is seldom recycled
or returned to the soil. A higher population density, centralized water and sewage
systems, and thermal power and gas have gradually turned houses into sources of
environmental pollution. Counteracting the contamination of the environment
requires tremendous financial resources.
Agriculture in Uzbekistan relies heavily on irrigated lands. There are 4.2
million hectares of irrigated lands, compared with 27 million hectares of
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unirrigated lands. Recent analyses indicate that the quantity of irrigated lands
suffering from low and medium levels of salinity has increased noticeably. In
addition, drainage waters which flow into the Upper Amu Darya, when combined
with the salinization of the soil in the upper layers, hamper agricultural production
in a large portion of the Aral Sea region.  Due to poor water resource
management, and the absence of appropriate user fees, water consumption has
tended to be high and inefficient. A result of this has been the progressive
increase in the proportion of saline land to about 53%, and the fall in the level of
the Aral Sea (Bortnik, 1992).  Until very recently, over 90% of the population in
the region relied on irrigation water for drinking water supply at least part of the
year.  As a result, the incidence of typhoid and hepatitis in the oblasts bordering
the sea remains five times the average for all of Uzbekistan (Anderson, 1997).
Uzbekistan’s neglect of the needs of the Karakalpak people has translated
into a human tragedy of mounting proportions.  With the desiccation of the Aral
Sea has come health problems on an unprecedented scale. As of 1994, maternal
deaths were 120 per 100,000 live births, and infant mortality was 60 per 1,000
live births, hence 40% above the rate of Uzbekistan (OneWorld, 1997).  Studies
show that of the 700,000 women there, some 97 percent are anemic with
hemoglobin levels in their blood well below the World Health Organization’s
standard of 110 grams per liter. Five times the percentage of women affected a
decade ago being the highest rate in the world (FAO, 1997).
There exists three types of poverty: income poverty (those with incomes
which fall below a certain level of consumption), capability poverty (those who
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lack the ability to live a lone life, enjoy good health, have access to knowledge,
particularly vulnerable groups), and social deprivation poverty (where incomes
and capabilities are unacceptably lower than the norms of their community). It is
estimated that 44% of the Uzbekistan population fell in the category of poor
during the period of perestroika, in terms of income poverty, and this increased to
75% by 1991, due largely to inflation during the period of perestroika. It has been
relatively stable since then, as indicated by the slight reduction in crime rates
since 1992 is an indicator (UNHDP, 1997).
The United Nations Development Programme Human Development
Report Office put forward a set of seven proposals to reduce poverty in
Uzbekistan :
• To reduce income poverty :
• Resume economic growth, so as to assure more sustainable levels
of incomes;
• Emphasis should be placed on employment intensive growth,
instead of relying on capital intensive energy and mineral sectors,
so as to absorb the surplus labour in agriculture;
• Promote small and medium-scale enterprises, and remove
obstacles to their full expansion;
• Establish a guaranteed employment scheme to provide productive
employment to those working in declining sectors of activities.
• To reduce capability poverty :
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• Invest in human capital through education and training, to reduce
capability poverty;
• Strengthen health services, particularly of preventive health
services, e.g. water, smoking, alcohol.
• To reduce social deprivation poverty :
• Provide transfer payments to vulnerable groups, and/or community
support groups to such groups (aged, disabled, women, children,
etc.).
Dependence on the Aral Sea Basin
Twenty two million Uzbeks live in the Aral Sea basin (449,000 square
kilometers). More than 36% of the Uzbek GDP is derived from agriculture, while
40% of all employment is in the agricultural sector.  The increasing salinity of
irrigated land in Uzbekistan has hampered production, thereby increasing rural
unemployment.
The ICWC allocates 11.2 and 22 cubic kilometers from the Syr Darya and
Amu Darya, respectively, to Uzbekistan.  However, agrciculture consumes 60
cubic kilometers of water from the total 75 cubic kilometers of water resources in
Uzbekistan (World Bank, 1997).  In the Syr Darya basin, Uzbekistan also receives
3.25 cubic kilometers of water and 1.1 billions kilowatt-hours of hydroelectric
power from Kyrgyzstan.  Uzbekistan trades 400 million-kilowatt hours of power




Located at the very heart of Central Asia, Uzbekistan is the only country
to border all five other republics. It is a compact country with a sizeable
population which makes it a realistic base for local manufacture. Uzbekistan is the
fourth-largest producer in the world of cotton, seventh-largest producer of gold,
tenth-largest producer of natural gas.
Providing approximately 30% of GDP, agriculture continues to be one of
Uzbekistan’s highest development priorities. Within this sector, cotton production
is predominant, making second largest exporter. Due partly to high world market
prices, Uzbekistan’s 1995 harvest of 4 million tons contributed 75% of its hard
currency earnings and was instrumental in cutting the national budget deficit to
approximately 4%. By the same measure, lower prices and a somewhat
diminished yield in 1996 contributed to a $348 million trade deficit and
jeopardized much of the progress of the previous year. Cotton is likely to retain its
standing in Uzbekistan’s economy if a $66 million World Bank loan approved in
June 1995 is effective in improving yields. Cotton export outside of Uzbekistan
remains under a state monopoly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations (MFER), though the government has reduced the level of state orders
from 75% of the planned harvest in 1994 to a projected 30% in 1997. This would
theoretically increase the portion of the harvest available to private farms for
export within the CIS, assuming that they are able to exceed government
production targets (which were not always met in 1996).  Because farmers must
sell their crops to MFER at government dictated prices, MFER can then sell the
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same crops on the world market and keep the profits.  Furthermore, the MFER
gives subsidy to farmers for their crops and set the output quotas.  This means that
production decisions are not based on the price of inputs or outputs, thereby not
encouraging the optimization of the Aral Sea basin waters.
The government has also boosted the amount of land dedicated to grain
production in an effort to reduce Uzbekistan’s dependence on food imports. Land
under grain cultivation increased from 1.3 million hectares in 1995 to 1.7 million
in 1996, whereas cotton cultivation since 1980 has fallen gradually to the current
level of 1.5 million hectares. Despite the increase in land under cultivation, grain
production fell short of government targets in both 1995 and 1996 with total
yields of approximately 2.7 million metric tons each year. The 1996 shortfall was
particularly damaging in that it combined with similar declines in Kazakstan,
forcing Uzbekistan to import grain at very high world market prices and
contributing further to the trade deficit noted above. Government plans to improve
yields through gradual farm privatization and various agronomic reforms have yet
to materialize.
Uzbekistan’s nonferrous metals, particularly gold, already make a strong
contribution to its export earnings. Currently producing approximately 70 tons of
gold per year, Uzbekistan is the seventh largest producer in the world and (with
only 25% of proven fields in production) contains the fourth largest reserves. In
1992, the Government of Uzbekistan entered into a joint venture with the U.S.-
based Newmont Mining Company to produce an estimated 5 million ounces of
gold over the next 16 years from the Muruntau mine. The government has also
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entered into a $250 million venture with the British firm Lornho to extract gold in
the Amantaytau region and the Kizil Kum desert. Other minerals which play an
important role in Uzbekistan’s economy include uranium, copper, zinc, tungsten,
silver, molybdenum and lead . Currently the world’s fourth largest uranium
producer, Uzbekistan exported nearly $11 million in uranium concentrate to the
U.S. in 1996. Copper production is also highly developed. The Almalyk mining
and metallurgical works, near Tashkent, processes most of Uzbekistan’s copper
and zinc, currently generating approximately $300 million in copper and $10
million in zinc exports per year.
Uzbekistan possesses substantial hydrocarbon resources, particularly in
natural gas, where it is among the world’s ten largest producers. Most notable
among Uzbekistan’s natural gas fields are the giant Mingbulak and Kokdumalak
fields currently yielding approximately 45 billion cubic meters of natural gas per
year.  In the oil industry, Uzbekistan has attained the distinction of being the only
former Soviet state to enhance production since independence. Having doubled its
1991 production levels from 35 million to more than 63 million barrels in 1995,
Uzbekistan has achieved petroleum self-sufficiency and is thereby able to avoid
costly imports from Russia.
Electric power in Uzbekistan is derived primarily from natural gas-
powered thermal plants with a smaller portion coming from coal and hydro-
electric facilities. Uzbekistan currently possesses 11,000MW in electric
generating capacity with plans for an additional 4,000MW through rehabilitation
of existing and/or development of new plants. The largest natural gas-powered
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facilities include the Syr Darya and Navoi plants. The coal-powered facilities
consist principally of two power plants in the vicinity of the Angren open pit mine
near Tashkent. Hydro-electricity is generated from 25 plants which together
produce 15% of Uzbekistan’s electricity.  The Ministry of Energy hopes to boost
Uzbekistan’s electric generating capacity through a number of projects including
an $81 million renovation of the Syr Darya plant using EBRD funds, the
construction of a thermal plant near Termez, renovation of the Angren and





Covering an area of 488,100 square kilometers, Turkmenistan is the fourth
largest republic in the former Soviet Union and the second largest in Central Asia
(Figure 3. 3).  The Kara Kum desert comprises 80% of Turkmenistan’s total area.
The desert is bounded by a series of oases watered by the Amu Darya in the north
and by rivers (the Murgap, Tejen, Atrek) descending from the Kopetdag Gershi
and other mountains in the south. The central and western regions have no
significant natural waterways, but the Kara Kum Canal brings water from the
Amu Darya west to the Mary Oasis and onward to Ashgabat.
Turkmenistan has an extreme continental climate: temperatures in
Ashgabat vary between 46oC in summer and -5oC in winter, although it has been
known to reach -22·oC in extremity. Temperatures in the desert in summer can
reach 50oC during the day before falling rapidly at night. During the winter it can
reach –10 to-15oC.
Turkmen is the official state language, and is closer to Turkish, Azeri and
Crimean Tartar than those of its neighbours, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan. The
Turkmen script was changed from Latin to Cyrillic in 1940, but the process of
changing back to the Turkish version of the Latin script is underway.  Table 3.3
shows that Turkmen make up almost three fourths of the population (Roy, 1997).
84
Figure 3.3:  Location of Turkmenistan.







Under Russian rule from 1881, the area initially resisted the Bolsheviks
but fell to the Red Army by 1920. In 1925 the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic
was formed from Turkmenian portions of Soviet Turkistan. In 1991 the republic’s
parliament declared Turkmenistan independent following a referendum; after the
Soviet Union collapsed, the republic joined the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS). The former Communist party has retained its hold on power in
Turkmenistan, although there has been some movement toward privatizing the
economy.
The current President is Sapurmurat Niyazov, who has been given the
honorific title Turkmenbashi – leader of all Turkmen. He was elected President in
1992, having been Chairman of the Supreme Soviet since 1990, standing as the
sole candidate. In a referendum in 1994 he was confirmed as President by 99.9 %
of the eligible electorate vote.
Economic Needs
Over the last few years, economic development in Turkmenistan has been
characterized by a decrease in the volume of production. This is the consequence
of the gradual transition to a market economy which has been accompanied by
changes in the economic mechanisms within and the economy. In 1994, national
income was 80% of the level of 1990. This fall is due to decreases in natural gas
extraction and the rise of agricultural prices. The speed of economic growth still
depends on the volume of natural gas which is extracted and sold. The insolvency
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of countries which purchase Turkmen gas is the main reason for the instability in
the sector and the cause of the slowdown in the rate of extraction.
Another major priority being tackled by the government is the need to
raise productivity in agriculture, and to carry out a gradual decrease in
employment in the agricultural sector, and to use the majority of the work force in
other branches of industry. The reorientation of some areas of the economy
through the involvement of foreign partners is being strengthened. For this,
foreign currency from the sale of mineral raw materials and oil products is being
used.
The Government’s programme "Ten Years of Stability" forms the
foundation for budget policy in Turkmenistan and envisages a phased transition
towards a market economy. This transition is not the main goal of economic
development, but an important means of raising the living standards of the
population.  In Turkmenistan, economic reforms have a higher priority than
political reforms, yet it is recognized that economic reforms can only be
successfully realized when accompanied by political stability. The economic
model selected by Turkmenistan envisages the preservation of strong state power,
so as to not only provide guarantees for government macro-economic regulation
of the economy, but also the provision of all conditions from the government’s
side for the successful realization of reforms. The government is striving to create
a developed mixed economy, which implies the implementation of
Turkmenistan’s own model of economic management.
87
Although the share of agriculture in national income is 44%, industry
(with 24% of national income, of which 67% is derived from fuel-energy) is
considered the basis of the economy of Turkmenistan. With 1,600 enterprises
employing 150,000 people, the role of industry since independence has increased.
The main sources of wealth of Turkmenistan are oil and natural gas. In 1994, 35
million barrels of oil (including gas condensate) were produced. 35.7 billion cubic
meters of gas were produced out of total gas extraction possibilities of 90 billion
cubic meters per year. The country has the fourth largest reserve of natural gas in
the world and 64% of total oil reserves in Central Asia. Annual gross revenues for
oil and gas are expected to reach $7.3 billion and $13.7 billion respectively which
more than cover the $5.5 billion anticipated for hydro-carbon extraction, refining
and transport through pipelines.
Turkmenistan has a long agricultural tradition and a well established
infrastructure. As a major producer of cotton and grain, and with good potential
from food crops and livestock production (only 10% of suitable agricultural land
is presently being farmed), the Government’s New Agricultural Policy aims to
increase production of these crops, and to be able to satisfy local demand for most
types of food. This will be accelerated by the progressive privatization of farm
plots and the attraction of foreign and domestic capital for joint ventures.
Substantial progress has been made in providing the appropriate legislative
framework for privatization and other economic activities, while maintaining the
regulatory role of the government in this process.
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While the high and stable population growth rate provides an annual
growth of the labour force, it is estimated that the number of individuals entering
the labour force is approximately four times higher than the number leaving. The
closing of unprofitable enterprises, privatization and "demonopolisation" of
property have contributed to a rise in unemployment.
Thus from 1990 to 1994, the labour force grew by 13.3% whereas the
number of employees in the economy grew by only 8.3%. At the same time the
employment structure of the economy has been changing, as evidenced by a 4.4
% reduction in employment in the public sector 1990 and 1994, a 1.3% reduction
in the cooperative sector, and a 3.4% rise of the private sector. Moreover, during
the same period, the number of employees in the productive sectors increased,
while the number of employees in the public service sectors has decreased.
Social Needs
In 1992, the share of the budget dedicated to social purposes decreased
dramatically. This decline was caused by the economic reforms in the country, the
beginning of the transition toward market relations and the lack of budget
resources. During 1991 to 1994, the expenditure on education and health
increased while the expenditures on allowances and pensions were significantly
decreased.
There has been a general deterioration in the health of the population, in
spite of the high number of doctors (35 per 1,000). Also, inadequate attention has
been paid to primary health care, as opposed to the maintenance of a large
hospital infrastructure, with an excessive number of beds, and an occupancy rate
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of only 72%. Major reforms of the health care system have been introduced,
including the establishment in 1996 of a voluntary state medical insurance and a
comprehensive Health Reforms Programme which was launched in mid 1995.
This should contribute to adapting health care services and systems more
effectively to needs.
The education sector has also been undergoing major reforms, as it tries to
adapt to the needs of a market economy, and of the next century. It is the largest
branch of the social sector, employing 47% of workers in the social sector, and
receiving 61.5% of state budget expenditures allocated for social and cultural
measures. Turkmenistan has achieved great success in education. By 1989, the
level of literacy had reached 99.6%, and the number of workers with higher and
secondary education is growing at an increasing rate. However, as for the health
sector, a new education policy was introduced in 1993, with a view to adapting
the education and training system to the future needs of the country. A similar
process is under way with respect to science and technology, so as to reorient
areas of priority from those required for the former Soviet Union, to those of the
new state.
There are 425,000 pensioners (73% old age pensioners) in the country, or
nearly 10% of the population. Five types of pensions are granted to eligible
people (old age pensions, disability pensions, pensions for the loss of the bread-
winner, social pensions for persons who have never worked and supplementary
pensions). Insurance payments are compulsory for all workers. The result is that it
has been possible to raise pensions, which is made easier by the low proportion of
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pensioners. Problems have arisen due to the difficulties of targeting state
assistance to the most needy populations.
A number of measures are urged to improve the existing system of
pensions on an equitable basis, including improved targeting for low-income
families.  In summary, recommendations for a poverty prevention strategy in
Turkmenistan include:
• Increase the system of social assistance to the poor particularly by
improving targeting of beneficiaries;
• Improve the management system of social protection;
• Activate employment incentive system; and
• Expand sources of financing for the system of social protection,
particularly from no-state funds.
Demographic trends in Turkmenistan are different from those in other CIS
countries in that they have been characterized by a dynamic increase in the
population, presently 2.5% per year, primarily because of the high rate of natural
growth.  The high fertility rate of 4.5 children per mother, and the consistently
high birth rate averaging 33 births per 1000.  Migration has also played a
significant role, through the emigration during the period 1991 to 1995 of about
43,500 people to other republics of the former Soviet Union, of whom in 1995
72.2% were ethnic Russians.  Among these, most were military personnel. The
rate of migration was highest among specialists with higher or secondary
technical education.
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However, the Aral Sea crisis has crippled the health of Turkmenistan.  In
Nukus, cancer of the esophagus, which can be linked to diet as a well as
environmental factors, is about six time the average in Turkmenistan.  The
Dashkovsky region, though not physically bordering the Aral Sea, is the closest
part of Turkmenistan to the sea, has a infant mortality rate of 52 per 1000, while
the rest of Turkmenistan has 58 per 1000 rate (Anderson, 1997).
The issue of poverty in Turkmenistan, as in the other post-socialist
countries, was not a pressing matter in the past. In the old system, income
distribution was more even, employment was guaranteed, and a broad system of
social protection provided social support for families with many children, people
with disabilities and other vulnerable members of society. Western specialists
estimated that indices of inequality in the republics of the former Soviet Union
were similar to those for countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), and that the population that fell under the category of
poor was less than 7%.  However, the situation changed sharply with the
beginning of the transition to a market economy.  There is an increasing income
disparity and stratification of the society into rich and poor. Price liberalization,
for example, resulted in further deterioration in real incomes of the relatively poor
people. The existing system of social protection could not adjust to new economic
conditions and high inflation and could not provide adequate social assistance to
the vulnerable segments of the population. These factors have created a condition
of increasing poverty among the most vulnerable segments of the population.
92
In Turkmenistan, the main factors of potential poverty are family size,
number of dependents, wage differentials, age, unemployment and the increase in
the cost of living. These need to be taken into consideration in the implementation
of a poverty prevention strategy in order to achieve sustainable human
development.  Turkmenistan relies deeply on agriculture both for food and for
work.  The agricultural sector itself is dependent on the waters of the Amu Darya
for irrigation, thereby making the management of the Amu Darya a priority for
the country.
The macro-economic policy of the country is very important as a means of
preventing poverty for certain segments of the population. A correlation is known
to exist between a change in real GDP and the proportion of poor people. In the
period between 1987 and 1993, the GDP of Turkmenistan declined by 14 %,
which is smaller than the decline observed in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan (21 %
and 30 %, respectively). Accordingly the share of the poor in Turkmenistan
increased fourfold from 1987 to 1994, which is also smaller than the increase in
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan (6.3 times and 10 times, respectively). In 1993, it is
estimated that the percent of the poor in Turkmenistan was 48% compared to 12%
in 1987, while that for Kazakstan was 50% compared to 5% in 1987 and for
Kyrgyzstan, 76% compared to 12%. Strikingly, neighbouring Uzbekistan with a
0% change in GDP between 1987 and 1993, had 29 % of its population estimated
as poor compared to 24% in 1987.
The former high levels of opportunity which women enjoyed during the
Soviet period, and the high status they were granted due to their high educational
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training and their substantial role in socioeconomic spheres, have been continued
during the transition period. A wide range of rights has been maintained unlike in
other countries of the former Soviet Union. The high rates of women’s
employment (41% of blue and white collar workers [compared to 39.5% in
1970];47% of industrial workers; and 46% in sales and public catering) are
impressive. Women also accounted for 36% of those employed at management
levels and in administration, and 18% of positions in Parliament. However, the
transition to a market economy has resulted in a reduction of staff in many non-
industrial sectors, and women have often been vulnerable to industrial layoffs and
their share in the total number of workers and employees fell from 4 % in 1990 to
41% in 1994. Women comprise 40% of those looking for jobs.
Turkmenistan’s arid climate and limited water resources, have obliged it to
invest heavily in reservoirs and irrigation systems for agriculture. The Amu Darya
feeds water to the Karakum canal, the largest irrigation canal in the world, which
runs for more than 1,100 kilometers across the southern part of the country and
irrigates 900,000 hectares of land, out of a total of 1.6 million hectares of irrigated
land.  More than half of total agricultural production is produced in the canal
zone, which also provides water for most of the large industrial cities.  The
agriculture output from this land contributes to more than 11% of the GDP.  In
Turkmenistan, 90% of the water consumed, hence 23 cubic kilometers per year, is
used for irrigation.
About 80 % of the country, mainly the northern and central parts, is desert.
Of the area suitable for irrigation (17 million hectares), only 10% are presently
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under irrigation, through a massive network of 39,000 kilometers of canals, and a
drainage system of 35,000 kilometers in length.  Salinisation or the high level of
subsoil waters have affected about 42% of the area making agriculture production
plunge.
Air pollution is a significant problem in certain areas, due to industrial
emissions and that from vehicles. Water pollution has been a serious problem in
the Amu Darya, due to inflows of sewage and drainage salts from irrigation.
Further environmental problems which affect Turkmenistan relate to the falling
waters of the Aral Sea, starting in 1960, and the rising waters of the Caspian Sea
(26.5 meters to 29 meters), starting in 1978. Both have necessitated concerted
international action and reflection. In addition, the country is faced with the
continual threat of natural disasters from earthquakes, floods, landslides, and dust
storms.
 Dependence on Aral Sea Basin
Turkmenistan has the largest area of all the countries in the Aral Sea basin,
492,000 square kilometers, where 4.5 million Turkmens live.  The ICWC
allocates 22 cubic kilometers of water per year to Turkmenistan.  Turkmenistan’s
total water consumption is 23.8 cubic kilometers per year, making it extremely
dependent on the Amu Darya.
Agriculture makes up 50% of the GDP and employs 45% of the
workforce.  The salinisation of the upper layers of soil has greatly affected the
rural community’s production and employment threatening Turkmenistan’ s
position as the world’s 10th largest producer of cotton.  Turkmenistan has a 60%
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rural population depending on agriculture as a source of employment.
Meanwhile, 80% of Turkmenistan’s GDP is from industrial production.  Of that
industrial production, 33% is hydroelectric power from the Amu Darya.
Availability of Resources
Turkmenistan is destined to become one of the world's principal suppliers
of natural gas in the 21st century.  Turkmenistan has the world's fourth largest
known natural gas reserves, after Russia, the U.S. and Iran, with proven reserves
totaling 113 trillion cubic feet or 4 trillion cubic meters. The country has rich
deposits of other minerals. Chief among these is oil. The Energy Information
Administration (EIA) of the Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that
Turkmenistan's proven reserves range from 0.8 to 1.4 billion barrels of oil and
102 to 189 tcf of natural gas (EBRD, 1997).  However, there are also significant
deposits of sulfur, potassium, and rock salts. Turkmenistan is one of the world's
ten largest producers of cotton and is developing a textile industry. The country is
situated at the heart of a developing trade region encompassing Russia, the
Middle East, Turkey, the trans-Caucasus and the Indian sub-continent. The
country has a major port on the Caspian Sea, Turkmenbashi. Although still at an
early stage of transition from command to free-market economy, the country is
expected to carry through reform over the next few years.
In 1995, Turkmenistan exported 23 billion cubic meters of natural gas,
down from a high of 86 billion cubic meters in 1989, through Russian-controlled
pipelines to CIS markets. Turkmenistan is actively pursuing other pipeline options
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to Turkey, Pakistan and China. Turkmenistan also has 1.4 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves. Many of the known reserves were undeveloped during the
Soviet period due to limitations in technology and export routes. Turkmenistan is
self-sufficient in electricity and exports about 25% of its 13 billion kwh to its
neighbors, often in barter arrangements (BISNIS, 1997).
Agriculture plays a major role in the country’s economy, accounting for
nearly half of Turkmenistan’s Gross Domestic Product and more than two-fifths
of total employment. Turkmenistan’s favorable climate and long growing season
makes it suitable for growing cotton and a variety of other crops including grains,
vegetables, and fruits. There is also considerable livestock raising. Little food is
processed in Turkmenistan, and what is grown often spoils because of inadequate
harvesting. Turkmenistan imports large quantities of grain, milk and dairy
products, and various other food staples. The government, hoping to make
Turkmenistan self-sufficient in food by the end of this decade, is currently
investing in dairy and sugar processing plants and equipment. Cotton is and will
continue to be Turkmenistan’s most valuable crop, earning foreign exchange for
the economy. However, the amount of land devoted to cotton production may be
reduced in the future due to the government’s attempt to diversify its agricultural





Tajikistan is a small country, shown in Figure 3.4, 93% mountainous and
covering 54,000 square miles.  It is made up of a number of distinct and relatively
isolated regions separated by high mountain ranges. Some of these regions are
more closely linked economically to neighboring countries than to one another.
The population is highly concentrated in the western half of the country as the
eastern half consists of the Pamir mountain range, the foothills of the Himalayas.
The northern region, Leninabad Oblast, is Tajikistan’s most industrialized
and developed area and includes its second largest city, Khojand. Located in the
Fergana Valley, it is tightly integrated with Uzbekistan which surrounds it on
three sides. Dushanbe and the surrounding Hissar Valley are another important
industrial center, including textile, metal working, and building materials
factories, most of Tajikistan’s hydroelectric capabilities, as well as the giant
Tursunzade aluminum plant. Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube, the hardest hit areas
during Tajikistan’s civil war, are the heart of Tajikistan's cotton production. Garm
and Gorno-Badakhshan, the poorest and most isolated regions, rely on production
of potatoes, fruits, such as nuts and honey, livestock and tobacco.
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Figure 3.4: Location of Tajikistan.
Approximately 70% of the population lives in rural areas, making
Tajikistan the least urban of the former Soviet republics.  Tajikistan has a
population of almost 6 million people.  The official language is Tajik, a dialect of
Persian. The ethnicity of Tajikistan is shown in Table 3.4.  It should be noted that
the number of Russians since 1989 have decreased by 5% (Roy, 1997).
99
Table 3.4: Ethnic Groups in Tajikistan
Tajiks 67  %
Uzbeks 23  %
Russians 2.5  %
Others 7.5  %
History
The Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was founded in
November 1924 as part of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic.  Its borders,
however, included only one third of the Tajiks living in the region.  Thus
Tajikistan’s borders were marked artificially and did not coincide with
ethnographical realities (Niyazi, 166).  Tajikistan became an independent country
in September 1991.
Power was retained by the Communist Party until unrest between the
Islamic fundamentalists and the anti-Communists irrupted in 1992.  Although the
1992 civil war, which was caused by regional economic and political differences,
largely subsided by March 1993, there continues to be sporadic fighting along the
Tajik border with Afghanistan between remnants of the Tajik opposition and
Russian border guard forces. Although the northern region of Leninabad, the site
of the majority of Western business focus in Tajikistan, had been immune from
the fighting, 1996 saw the first incidents of political demonstrations and protests
in the region against the government.
The government of President Emomali Rakhmonov is dominated by
Tajiks from the southern Kulyab region who were victorious in the 1992-93 civil
war. The November 1994 Presidential election, while peacefully conducted, was
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marred by fraud and intimidation, as were the February 1995 parliamentary
elections. Tajikistan also adopted a new constitution in November 1994, which
while not a perfect document, is still judged to be a significant improvement over
the Soviet-era version.
Russia and Tajikistan’s fellow Central Asian neighbors--Kazakstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan--have been concerned about drug and gun running
across the borders as well as Islamic fundamentalism, and have mostly supported
Tajikistan’s secular regime. Russia has been concerned to safeguard the 90,000
ethnic Russian’s still residing in Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to safeguard the 1.5
million ethnic Uzbeks residing there. Discrimination against ethnic Russians in
Tajikistan has increased and fuels a continuing exodus of Russians from
Tajikistan.  The only political violence in Dushanbe has been a number of killings
of ethnic Russians, usually soldiers, which has been of little comfort to Russian
civilians.
Tajikistan’s neighbors in the region, in particular Uzbekistan and the
Russian Federation, maintain great influence over the course of internal Tajik
politics through the presence of armed forces (the largely Russian CIS
peacekeeping forces), supply of economic credits and humanitarian assistance,
and the ability to control virtually all access to Tajikistan. Due to the geography
of the region and the whims of Soviet planners, Tajikistan is largely at the mercy
of Uzbekistan for all overland and rail transport. Tajikistan has moved to reduce
its energy dependency on Uzbekistan by signing a tripartite agreement on trade,
economic and cultural relations with Turkmenistan and Iran. Turkmenistan
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provides Tajikistan with reduced cost fuel and natural gas as part of the
agreement.
Economic Needs
The economy of Tajikistan in the post-Soviet period was characterized by
a sharp decline in production. The main industrial and economic relations with
Russia were broken.  The civil war has inflicted much damage on the
infrastructure and greatly affected human resources. The declines in production,
which started in 1989, became more obvious after the breakdown of the Soviet
Union. By 1992, the total volume of the national income (net material product)
was 63.4% of what it had been in 1985. Although the civil war, unfavorable
weather, and floods during the last three years aggravated the decline of
production, the main cause was the cessation of incoming goods and equipment,
i.e., the loss of transfers with the former Soviet republics.
Industry comprises 60% and agriculture 15.4% of the economy. The
decline in productivity in these major sectors has led to the general decline of the
economy of Tajikistan. In 1993, industrial production per capita was 44.9% less
than in 1985, and agricultural production was 46.9% less. Before the breakdown
of the Soviet Union, industrial capacity was 70 to 95% of production. At present it
is less than 30%. Many major factories such as the Refrigerator Production Plant,
the Tajik Textile Plant, and the Khojand Silk Plant, are closed. The declining
production has made Tajikistan become the least developed member of the CIS.
Along with external factors, internal situations have contributed to the decline in
production. These include political instability, weak control of the economy, lack
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of labor resources for industry as people switch to other occupations, absence of
small and medium-sized enterprises involved in the production of goods and
services, and increase of criminality due to the presence of weapons and
ammunition among the population.
The industry of Tajikistan operates on imported raw materials and
equipment. The equipment for agriculture, construction, transport and many other
sectors was imported from CIS countries. With the economic links with the
republics of the former USSR broken, Tajikistan now faces great difficulties in
securing supplies of raw materials, consumer goods and food items. Negative
consequences of the breakdown were intensified due to the geography of the
country. Tajikistan is a mountainous country, the majority of its area is not
densely populated, and transport and communication systems with other countries
and regions are poorly developed.
As economic relations disintegrated, barter trade replaced the normal
exchange of goods. Since Tajikistan has only limited resources for barter trade,
the country remains dependent on the sister republics of the former Soviet Union.
However, after independence some dramatic changes took place in the trade
relations of Tajikistan. Trade increased with developed countries and declined
with CIS and developing countries. Currently, more than 70% of the exports of
Tajikistan are bound for Belgium, the Netherlands, USA and Switzerland.




The civil war that ravaged Tajikistan soon after Independence was a
tragedy of major proportions. Like other states that emerged from the former
Soviet Union, Tajikistan was poorly prepared for the difficult tasks of nation
building, particularly that of establishing a universal sense of national pride and
identity. In a society that is as ethnically diverse as Tajikistan’s, it would have
been difficult under the best conditions. Before Tajikistan could create a country
and its identity, however, the civil war pitted Tajik against Tajik in a violent
conflict of two opposing views of the future of the new nation - religious
exclusivism versus secular pluralism. A nation that should have emerged with
pride and hope in the future was scarred by hatred, death, fear and uncertainty. It
is the pride of Tajikistan that the majority of its population - of every ethnic
group, clan and religious or political outlook - is striving toward reconciliation
and a common pursuit of a stable, democratic society. The civil war had a
significant impact on the national character, which is reflected in demographics,
social relations and the political process and aspirations of the Republic.
Nearly 1 million people, or one of every six Tajiks, were displaced by the
war. More than 250,000 persons fled the country entirely, and nearly another
700,000 persons were internally displaced. Khatlon Oblast alone, where one of
every four persons was uprooted, accounted for at least 50% of the displaced. In
some cases, the entire population of a village was forced to flee.
In order to ensure the safe return of refugees and the internally displaced
persons, the "Law on Refugees" was adopted in 1993 and the Central Board for
104
Refugees and Forced Migrants was established within the Ministry of Labour and
Employment. International organizations such as the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and others
have been instrumental in assisting the safe repatriation and resettlement of
refugees. As a result of these combined efforts, by October 1995, 97% of the
internally displaced persons and 64% of the refugees who fled to Afghanistan had
been repatriated. On the other hand, only about 3,000 (1.5%) of those who fled to
other CIS countries have returned. The civil war unleashed powerful emotions
that continue to echo throughout society. Hatred was deliberately cultivated and
led to massacres, rapes and disappearances. It has been impossible to prosecute
nearly all these crimes of war, which has increased contempt for the law and
feelings of impunity among the criminal element. The incidence of violent crimes,
particularly those involving weapons, has steadily increased since the first
outbreak of hostilities.
In Tajikistan, agricultural land is not privatized; legal ownership always
resides with the State.  Tajikistan’s supply of agricultural land is extremely
limited, and over 70% of the population is rural, depending on use of the land for
their livelihoods. For these reasons the national Government wishes to ensure that
land remains accessible to a broad range of the population and is not concentrated
in a few hands. Under existing law, any farmer (dekhkan) head of household,
male or female, who is actively engaged in agricultural production, may apply for
a grant of land for private use. The size of a land grant is based on family size,
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agricultural experience and the availability of land in the applicant’s region. The
average dekhkan farm comprises some 7 hectares. Land is distributed from
sovkhozes (state farms), kolkhozes (collective farms) and the State reserves of
unused land. Under this scheme, the recipient of the grant has the right to use of
the land for agricultural purposes in perpetuity. He or she may bequeath that right
to his/her heirs. The land, however, may not be sold nor may it be converted to
non-agricultural use.
Education and literacy hold an especially honoured place in Tajik culture.
At the time of the last census in 1989, 97.6% of the adult population was literate.
Because of the civil war and the economic decline of the past half decade,
education has suffered severely. Schools have been destroyed, damaged and
closed; textbooks and other teaching materials are no longer produced; enrolment
has declined; teaching staff have emigrated or departed for better and more
regular paying jobs. Perhaps even more tragic is that many of those who are well
educated are discovering that much of what they have learned is irrelevant to the
new world that now confronts them.
While the average population density for all of Tajikistan is only 40.5
persons per square kilometer, for the total area actually populated the average
rises to 193 persons per square kilometer. In the heavily populated Hissar,
Fergana and Vakhsh valleys, there are 300 to 400 persons per square kilometer,
and in the cities of Dushanbe, Khujand and Kurgan-Tyube, 900 to 1,100 persons
per square kilometer. Along with the concentration of population, virtually all
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industrial and agricultural activity is confined to the same limited territory. The
environmental impact of such concentration has been significant.
Prior to 1992, the Government did not collect statistics on unemployment.
Officially, there was no definition of unemployment and, as a consequence, there
were no unemployed. In 1992, the Ministry of Labour and Employment began to
register persons as unemployed according to a newly established definition. To be
registered as an unemployed person, an individual must first register in person at
an Employment Centre at their place of residence. They must also demonstrate
that they are actively seeking employment by making at least two visits per month
to the Employment Centre. Persons who fail to register are never counted among
the officially unemployed, and those who fail to report as required are removed
from the unemployment rolls after six months. Since the establishment of a
system for registering the unemployed, the numbers so registered have increased
each year. Some 10,900 persons were registered at the end of 1992; 21,600 at the
end of 1993; 32,100 at the end of 1994; and 30,500 on 1 November 1995.
A disproportionate number of the officially unemployed are women and
young people, as women comprise 45.9% of the total and 51% are youth between
the ages of 16 and 29 years. Over 60% of all women counted as unemployed are
persons without a profession or who have never previously held a job in the
formal economy. More than 50% of all youth between the ages of 16 and 29
registered as unemployed are recent secondary school graduates who have just
entered the job market. Calculation of a rate of unemployment depends on the
number used as a baseline. The officially unemployed as of 1 November 1995
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represented 1.1% of the officially defined labour resources but 1.6% of the actual
labour pool. These numbers, however, represent only a minor part of the crisis of
unemployment in the country.
Even by the most modest calculation, 513,500 persons presumed to be in
the active labour pool remain unaccounted for in the official statistics for the
employed and the unemployed. Even subtracting from this number the 300,000
persons estimated by the Ministry of Labour and Employment to be active in
private enterprise and the informal sector, an additional 11.6 % of the labour pool
are not considered to have employment.
"Hidden" unemployment is also known to exist. According to officials at
the Ministry of Labour and Employment, the number of persons on unpaid leave
increased 80% during the first nine months of 1995 compared to the previous year
to 126,100 persons. Another 13,100 persons not recorded as unemployed were
estimated to be working half time at most. Taken together this represents another
132,650 persons, or 7.2% of the labour pool, not working or actually, if not
formally, unemployed.
Dependence on Aral Sea Basin
Currently 6 million Tajiks live in 143,000 square kilometers of the Aral
Sea basin.  Only 5% of the GDP is from agriculture, while 45% of all
employment is in the agriculture business.   The ICWC allocates almost 10 cubic
kilometers of water from the Syr Darya and Amy Darya to Tajikistan, which
consumes 13 cubic kilometers per year.
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Tajikistan is the world’s third largest producer of hydroelectric power after
the U.S. and Russia. Hydroelectric generation accounts for 76% of total energy
output in the country and almost 80% of the GDP.  Energy consumption per
capita is among the lowest in the NIS.  An estimated 3.8 billion kWh of electricity
was exported to other Central Asian countries in 1996, generating approximately
$177 million in export earnings.  The primary consumer was Uzbekistan, which
consumed 3.4 billion kwh at a cost of nearly $170 million. Tajikistan is also an
importer of electricity and in 1996 imported electricity worth $135 million, which
amounted to almost 3 billion kwh, the bulk of which came from Uzbekistan
(BISNIS, 1997).
The hydroelectric power station at Nurek is one of the largest in the world.
The earthfilled Nurek dam, completed in 1980, is 300 meters tall (NHDP, 1997).
The construction of the Rogun dam, a legacy of Soviet gigantism, has been
discontinued and destroyed.  Rogun was designed to have a capacity of 3,600
megawatts, which would have produced an average annual output of 13.3 billion
kilowatt hours (BISNIS, 1997).
Availability of Resources
Tajikistan has substantial natural resources including gold, silver, coal,
rock, salt, lead, zinc, antimony, mercury, tin, and tungsten.  Many parts of the
country have a long history of manufacturing and there are numerous
opportunities to develop interesting businesses in a number of sectors aside from
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mining, such as cotton, textiles, agribusiness, aluminum industry and eco-tourism
(ERBD).
The agricultural sector is the major employer with 45% of the work force,
and the most important economic activity in Tajikistan. Agricultural production
makes a significant contribution to the balance of payments. Agriculture and
agribusiness have helped lead the way towards economic recovery for the country
since independence. Agriculture is more mechanized in Tajikistan than in
neighboring countries although the country now faces shortages of spare parts and
adequate maintenance. Although the agricultural sector is one of the most
modernized in the NIS, total output has been declining sharply during the last five
years. Cotton yields, for example, are suffering from a lack of fertilizers,
pesticides and herbicides. The main crop production areas lie in the irrigated
valleys of the tributaries of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya. About 720,000
hectares of land are under cultivation, mainly in the hands of state and collective
farms. Cotton, which is the major cash crop accounting for about two thirds of the
gross production value of the agriculture sector, takes up 35% of the cultivated
area. There are uncomfirmed reports that the government intends to permit
forward sales of cotton for the first time. The state cotton procurement agency,
Glavkhlopoprom, has indicated that some of the cotton should be sold from
foreign shipment points like Riga, Latvia, and that letters of credit should be used
rather than pre-payment terms. The introduction of forward trading would serve to
boost foreign confidence in Tajik cotton (BISNIS, 1997).
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The 1996/97 cotton harvest of approximately 315,000 tons fell well below
1995’s poor year of 415,000 tons, due to inadequate inputs, reduced acreage and
poor weather. Productivity also dropped in terms of kilograms per hectare. A total
of 12,000 tons of cotton was slated for use by the domestic cotton processing
industry in 1995.  In 1996, a total of 95,000 tons of cotton, with an estimated
value of $146 million, was exported to more than 18 countries. Tajik cotton
growers remain committed to the government purchasing and export agency,
Glavkhlopkoprom, despite the fact that it has been paying a low rate per ton of
cotton fiber. The heavy commitment to Glavkhlopkoprom means that the
presidential decrees freeing cotton from the state order system haven’t really been
able to operate to the degree anticipated. The situation is not helped by the fact
that the cotton gins remain in Glavkhlopkoprom’s hands, minimizing potential
competition for the farmers’ crop. The gins are supposed to be in the process of
privatization, which will help, but a cotton exchange is what is really needed to
get buyers and sellers together in a competitive situation (BISNIS, 1997).
Tajikistan produces about 2,000 barrels of oil per day. Therefore, it must
import almost all oil and petroleum products from states of the former Soviet
Union. Tajikistan has estimated natural gas reserves of 1 trillion cubic feet, but
gas production was minimal in 1993. Tajikistan thus relies heavily on imports of
natural gas from neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In June 1994,
Uzbekistan reduced natural gas transmissions to Tajikistan by 25% for failure to
pay an estimated $46 million in outstanding gas bills. The Tajik government
responded by immediately reducing gas supplies to municipal consumers. The
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Pamir mountains which divide Tajikistan create ample rivers which could be used
in producing hydroelectric energy. In an attempt to develop this energy source,
Tajikistan has borrowed 80 billion rubles from Moscow. The terms of the loan
require that Tajikistan pledge 50% of the shares of the Nurek hydroelectric power
station to Russia.
Underneath Tajikistan’s ever-present mountains lie a wide array of natural
resources, many of which have not yet been exploited because of their
geographical location or geological depth. For its size, Tajikistan is relatively
blessed with silver and gold deposits. Total silver ore deposits are estimated at
60,000 tons and the largest, in Bolshoi Kanemansur, is around 38,000 tons. There
are more than 30 known gold deposits, of which only a few have been prospected.
Several potentially important coal deposits have been identified but have not yet
been exploited.  Many of the mineral deposits are suitable for relatively
inexpensive open-pit mining, but they are found in mountainous regions where






The Kyrgyz Republic is a mountainous country.  About 94% of its
territory is situated at least 1,000 meters above sea level and 41% of its territory is
at least 3,000 meters above sea level (Figure 3.5). The average height above sea
level is 2,750 m, the maximum height 7,439 meters, the minimum height 401
meters (the territory of Lailaik district). The wide range of absolute heights,
complex relief, protracted geologic development of the country and other factors
result in the variety of natural conditions and the richness of natural resources. All
natural zones, characteristic of Northern Hemisphere, except for tropical zone,
can be encountered on the territory of the Republic. Kyrgyzsatan’s population of
January 1, 1996 was 4.49 million people, which included 70 different
nationalities.  Table 3.5 shows the largest ethnic groups which make up
Kyrgyzstan (Roy, 1997).
The climate ranges from extreme continental to nearly maritime due to
considerable relief raggedness and a large lake, Issyk-Kul. Summer is dry and hot.
Winter is rather cold, especially in the mountains and intermountain basins.  The
maximum air temperature is +44oC, the minimum -54oC (meteorological station
Ak-Sai). The largest amounts of precipitation per year, 1,090 mm, fall at the
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western slope of the Fergana ridge and the least, 144 mm, at the western extremity
of Issyk-Kul basin (Kyrgyzstan, 1997).
Figure 3.5:  Location of Kyrgyzstan.









The Kyrgyz area was annexed to Russia in 1864, and became the Kara-
Kyrgyz autonomous area in 1917.  The area was reorganized in 1926 and became
a constituent republic of the USSR in 1936 (Infopedia, 1996).  The Republic of
Kyrgyzstan was proclaimed by the Declaration of Sovereignty on August 31,
1991.  On May 5, 1993, the Constitution the Main Law declared a new name of
the state - the Kyrgyz Republic. The capital of the country is Bishkek, founded in
1878 and named Pishpek, since 1926 it has been called Frunze. On February 5,
1991 it was renamed  Bishkek.
According to the Constitution of the country, the Kyrgyz Republic is a
unitary, democratic, secular state, the priority legal norms of which are universal
human values.  The Main Law guarantees democratic rights to country citizens:
the freedom of religion, ecclesiastical and cult freedom, an open expression of
thoughts, ideas and opinions, the freedom of the press, the right for unrestricted
travelling and living everywhere, the right for property, the privacy of
correspondence, the freedom of meetings and demonstrations.  As well, the main
law guarantees the right for inviolability of dwelling, the freedom of the private
life, and universal equality before the Law.  According to the form of the
government, Kyrgyzstan is a democratic republic with a presidential form of
governing, based on norms of a law-abiding state.
Little has changed since independence in terms of governing structures,
the way decisions are made, or the people in power. State structures remain
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substantially the way they were ten years ago. A full-time Parliament was elected
in February 1995, but the way in which such a parliament will function has yet to
be worked out. An independent court system is in the process of being
established; yet the average citizen feels little difference in terms of personal
empowerment.  Furthermore, given the importance of establishing the rule of law
for democratic state-building, Kyrgyzstan has a long way to go in reforming its
courts and establishing an independent judiciary, along with a strong and self-
governing legal profession. Nevertheless, the People’s Assembly of Kyrgyzstan,
formed in January 1994, plays a special role in ensuring inter-ethnic and civil
harmony.
However, the transitional process of bringing about the intended market-
based regulation mechanisms has been accompanied by mistakes. It could hardly
have been otherwise, as the attempted transition has been carried out at the same
time as a struggle to bring the country out of an acute and profound economic
crisis and to alleviate its painful consequences in people’s lives. Indeed this period
of transition from communist to market economy has been without precedent in
history.   One must also consider that people in general are ignorant of market
principles, and the appropriate specialists for the new system do not exist in
sufficient numbers. Soviet executives still predominate in administrative
structures, and these have not only shown inability to move towards reform, they
also hindered it, as well as pursuing their own selfish interests to get rich while
hiding behind the notion of "economic freedom."
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Thus at times privatization yielded to a kind of privatizing introduction of
economic regulation and  gave way to dismantling of all regulation; and an
effective taxation system was seemingly destroyed before it was created. One
serious and urgent task now is to generalize the lessons of the reform experience
from 1991 to 1995, take account of positive experiences in other countries, and
make corrections to both the concept and programme of reform for 1996 to the
year 2000. The state should actively assist in developing economic freedom. The
entire system of market mechanisms in the transition period should be given a
thorough going-over.
Economic Needs
The people’s standard of living is continuing to drop correspondingly,
though again not as steeply as in 1994, a fact which is certainly related to the
positive results achieved in restraining economic decline and stabilizing public
finances. The level of inflation in 1995, at 32%, or 2.5% per month, was the
lowest it has been since the start of the economic reform, and was one of the
lowest in the CIS.  At the same time, GNP per capita has also declined from
$1160 to $610 in 1994.
The democratic processes now under way in the Kyrgyz Republic have
become irreversible, a fact which was shown by the recent parliamentary and
presidential elections. These constituted a firm political and social guarantee that
human development resources will be under the constant attention of the
government and that actions undertaken for human development will be under the
control of all people. However, the challenge of ensuring inter-ethnic and civil
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harmony still remains in light of a sharp decline in the country’s economic output,
high unemployment and a collapse in the social safety net that people had grown
accustomed to during the Soviet era. Ethnic tensions have heightened as non-
Kyrgyz feel the pinch of the government’s efforts at affirmative action. At the
same time economic deterioration and the shrinking pool of jobs and government
resources further exacerbated tensions between groups who see themselves in
competition with one another. Rapidly declining economic conditions and a
virtual cessation of state-sponsored social services contributed to the sharp
contrast Kyrgyz citizens see between their lives now in comparison with their
experience under the Soviet system.
National revenue produced in 1995 was 47.2% of the 1990 level, on a par
with the former Kyrgyz SSR’s output in 1979.  In other words, the five year
period from 1991 to 1995 witnessed an economic recoil of 25 years. A minimum
of 20 more years may be required to redress this, during which the country may
still face an economic crisis.
Efforts to analyze the shadow economy and to estimate its value have been
made. In 1994, the National Statistical Committee estimated that the shadow
economy amounted to 780 million Som (approximately US$ 52 million) or 6.5%
of GDP. Estimates have also been made to analyze undeclared production, which
in 1994 was valued at 2 to 2.5 billion Som (approximately US$ 167million), of
which bootleg liquor production alone generated around 1 billion Som
(approximately US$ 67 million). In addition revenue losses to the state, through
for instance the failure to register businesses and pay taxes, suggest that the
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discrepancy between total possible revenues from all forms of economic activities
and the actual amount taken in is of the order of 10 to 15 fold.
No less turnover takes place in the sphere of criminal business, which
includes the drug trade, of which the moral and material damage done is every bit
commensurate with the losses engendered by the development of other kinds of
shadow economic activity. Another big business is prostitution, together with the
direct and indirect trade in official commissions, involving a broad cross-section
of managers and employees of law enforcement organs. All of the above indicates
that the actual volume of the shadow economy is much larger than is thought by
official agencies, and that it awaits more precise estimation. As for the material
loss connected with the shadow economy, economic crime cases which were
brought to court in 1995 (which were arguably only a small proportion of the
total), involved in 1995 alone 475 million Som (approximately US$ 32 million),
which is four times more money than all income tax revenues, three times greater
than the state’s annual outlay for public security and civil order, 54% of the
republic’s budget and 85% of total profits earned by industrial enterprises.
Overcoming the growth of the shadow economy will evidently be
extraordinarily difficult. Factors working against this include the continuing
stratification of society according to property ownership, the low standard of
living of the majority of the population, lack of entrepreneurial background
among a great many managers, and most serious of all, absence of any large-scale
state actions to combat corruption, through for example the strengthening of law
enforcement and improving the legislative base. Also just as important is the
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problem of organizing data bases and analyzing the shadow economy in a
systematic way.
Social Needs
According to the World Bank, at the end of 1993, about 45% of the
population were categorized as poor and almost 30% more lived in extreme
poverty. In total, roughly 75% of the republic’s population are living below the
poverty line. The calculations of the national Statistical Committee and the World
Bank differ, but both testify to a high level of poverty. In 1993, Kyrgyzstan
adopted the Minimum Consumer Budget (MCB), established by law, and which is
linked to a set of 33 foods and non-food goods and services, expressed in
monetary price, which would provide a person with a level of consumption
accepted by society as the minimum allowable at the given stage of its
development. The MCB is a flexible measure and depending on a given threshold,
estimates of the population below the poverty line have varied from 71% to 92%,
implying that out of a population of 4.5 million, only 477,000 people are
considered to be sufficiently provided for in a material way.
This is not only the consequence of the economic crisis which has
occurred since 1991, but is also a legacy of the Soviet period. Since Kyrgyzstan
was traditionally one of the most backward republics of the USSR in terms of
economic and social development, and living standards, it used to receive
subsidies to alleviate the population’s socio-economic and social difficulties. But
with the disintegration of the USSR, these subsidies came to an end.
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With regard to the alleviation of poverty, the UN states that poverty
caused by low wages or low income can be reduced first of all through higher-
paying employment, improvement of labour qualifications and various
supplementary sources of legal income. Reducing poverty among the retired will
depend entirely on state solutions and on owners of non-state companies who may
define and allot pensions on their own account or in addition to state pensions.
Also, some but not all pensioners can supplement their incomes through work.
Just as serious as the problem of reducing poverty is the question of how to
provide jobs to the able-bodied population. Job shortages existed even in Soviet
times, but now many of the jobs no longer exist because of halted or decreased
production. Among employment problems, providing jobs for young people is
especially urgent.  Young people without jobs swell the ranks of the unemployed
and worse, the criminal world.
The transition period has given rise to at least three new types of
unemployment:
1. Unemployment caused by insufficient or absent demand for the
products of presently functioning enterprises, where labour supply
exceeds demand due to job cuts;
2. Structural unemployment, related to a deficit of personnel of a
particular profession and qualification level;
3. Frictional unemployment consisting of those who are entering the
labour market for the first time, or who have lost their jobs, or who are
changing jobs.
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Several alarming processes are occurring today which may undermine the
literacy and health of the population, the two HDI components which Kyrgyzstan
previous had at fairly high levels. Firstly in the education system, the fact that not
all school-age children are in school is cause for serious concern. Secondly, one
of the most serious consequences of the people’s sharp drop in living standards
has been the growth in infectious disease rates. Prostitution is on the rise, and
therefore sexually transmitted diseases. No less alarming has been the outbreak of
tuberculosis and other dangerous infectious diseases.
The situation of women in the labour market has worsened. Fifty percent
of the unemployed are women and 18% of these are mothers of many children. It
is more difficult, and increasingly so, for women to find work than for men. The
high proportion of women formerly employed in both productive and non-
productive spheres has contributed to their becoming the most vulnerable group.
While women in Kyrgyzstan tend to receive lower wages, have less access to
employment and undergo fewer years of schooling, as shown by the
corresponding male female gender gaps, women exceed men in terms of life
expectancy, in population and secondary enrollment. In other areas, such as that
of university enrollment, women far exceed their male counterparts (by 62%), and
by over 113% in the natural and applied sciences, thus showing women’s stronger
participation in knowledge-based fields. On the other hand, there were 46% more
of unemployed women than men.
Pollution is a major problem, particularly in urban areas. While falling
industrial and agricultural production has led to reductions in raw sewage
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emissions and emissions of atmospheric pollutants, the economic decline has also
cut funding for environmental protection and caused the quality of waste
treatment installations and garbage disposal to drop. Water pollution is
increasingly serious in Bishkek as aquifers of clean water have been penetrated by
surface water polluted by industrial and human waste. Vehicles are a major cause
of air pollution, and coal smoke in winter further aggravates air quality. In
agricultural areas, pesticides continue to deteriorate the environment. Excessive
cultivation of marginal lands, and deforestation has put pressure on land and
forest resources. Mining has also created large areas of waste land, with tailings
and other harmful substances being left exposed to neighbouring populations.
The necessity of protecting the environment was only first acknowledged in the
1980’s but no environmental protection programmes have been implemented in
full (UNHDP, 1997).
The republic’s housing space is on the whole expanding, through not to a
significant degree.  It is only private housing that is experiencing growth: state,
public and cooperative housing space is shrinking drastically due to lack of
funding. The acute housing shortage inherited from the Soviet period has not gone
away. Furthermore, the stock of buildings has continued to age and there have
been no capital repairs to residential buildings and  infrastructure since 1992, due
also to lack of funds. Although 90 % of all urban settlements in the country have
running water, electricity and telephones, the infrastructure is weak and prone to
breakdowns. In fact, human settlements are mostly rather unimproved, with low
quality roads and walkways, minimal landscaping and plantings and poorly
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constructed outbuildings, which all together reduce the quality of the human
environment.
Nevertheless, the country has been blessed with abundant water, an
extensive hydroelectric network and heating infrastructure. However, during the
Soviet period, and especially in its final years, the quality of construction in terms
of finished buildings was very low, and materials, especially those used in
finishing work and decoration, were of poor quality. Kyrgyz architects are now
attempting to improve the quality of design, both aesthetically to reflect cultural
traditions, as well as to be more resistant to the strains of the extreme weather
conditions and earthquakes.
Under the influence of corruption, organized crime and shadow economic
activities, society breeds destructive and anti-social desires which in turn work to
mould a corresponding consciousness.  Inattention to these problems attempts to
underplay their danger, and lack of a systematic approach to fighting these
phenomena can undermine the very viability of the nation.  Closely linked to the
loosening of moral and material controls on the poor economy and their
corresponding economic and social consequences, there has been a worsening of
personal safety caused by a rapid increase in crime. As the economic crisis
proliferated, the very infrastructure of society has been changing. Crime has
expanded both quantitatively and qualitatively, and remains largely unsolved, due
to the weakness of the law enforcement agencies.
Kyrgyzstan’s geographical location and transit routes place it in the centre
of a region of narcotics production and consumption, which has caused acute
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social problems. A flood of opium has poured into Kyrgyzstan, which is then sent
onward through the CIS, and countries further abroad. The nature and scale of
drug use in Kyrgyzstan itself has been both underestimated and misunderstood,
and partially kept out of the realm of public information and debate, thereby
worsening the problem. The explosion in crime witnessed in Kyrgyzstan has
many causes, of which the most important are:
• Changes in ownership relations and the ensuing confusion and mistrust
in the future, with the corresponding growth of opportunism to
appropriate property and money by illegal means;
• Drastic weakening of state power in general, and of power over
economic crime in particular;
• Errors in the conduct of economic reform, which contributed to a sharp
decline in the population’s standard of living (UNHDP, 1997).
Dependence on Aral Sea Basin
Out of 4.4 million people in Kyrgyzstan, 2.3 million Kyrgys live in the
Aral Sea Basin which encompasses 127,000 square kilometers.  The ICWC
allocates less than 0.4 cubic kilometers per year to Kyrgyzstan, which consumes a
total of 5 cubic kilometers (World Bank, 1996).  More than 36% of the GDP is
from agriculture, while 28% of all employment is in the agriculture business.
Kyrgyzstan also operates reservoirs and dams that are used for hydroelectric
power management and management of water releases for downstream countries
(Kygyzstan, 1997).  This production of hydroelectric power from the Syr Darya is
major source of income and employment.
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Availability of Resources
There are several types of minerals in production in Kyrgyzstan:
antimony, coal (twelve coal mining enterprises are in operation in different
regions including six open pit mines), gold (major and minor deposits and gold
mining enterprises), mercury, oil and gas, uranium trudovoye complex, and
quartz.  Kyrgyzstan also has deposits of rare strategic metals such as cesium,
yttrium and lanthanum. It has marble, granite and precious stones. Development
of the Kyrgyz mining and minerals industry, particularly gold mining, is planned
as a major basis for (1) strengthening the financial base for the reforms in
Kyrgyzstan, (2) to build up Kyrgyz gold reserves, and (3) to create jobs.
Kyrgyzstan is known for its gold-bearing deposits - large, small, placer or
bedrock, but until independence, only one deposit, the Makmalskoye, was
worked. The gold went to Moscow, and mining operations were secret. The
highest reported figures for production were in the range of 5,000 kg per year, but
in 1992 this fell to just over 1000 kg, down from 2,000 kg in 1991. By 1995,
production, mainly from Makmalskoye, was up to about 4,500 kg. Kyrgyzstan has
been reported as having on deposit two tons of gold bullion in a Swiss bank
(reported elsewhere as 1,634 kg with an additional 385 kg in the Kyrgyzstan
National Bank). Geologists have to date prospected several new gold deposits and
these, in addition to 30 deposits already explored, are planned for development.
Post-independence tenders to develop Kyrgyzstan’s gold mining industry
indicated that locally sourced funding and project experience were inadequate for
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the very large, complex projects that were required to accelerate economic
growth. Thus to develop its large mining projects, Kyrgyzstan depends on foreign
investors, in particular Cameco of Canada, which is developing the Kumtor
deposit. Kyrgyzstan hopes to take its gold production to 20 tons per year by 1998.
In 1993, oil production was 1 million barrels per year, coal production was 2-6
tons per year and natural gas production was 55 billion cubic meters, far below
the country’s consumption levels (BISNIS, 1997).
Kyrgyzstan is a major producer of hydroelectric power and has enormous
unexploited potential. Several potential projects are on the drawing board, but
need secured export markets and project financing. Two projects, to upgrade the
district power and heating plants, and second to upgrade and improve
maintenance of the electric distribution system are slated for multilateral
financing. These will provide opportunities for electric power exports. The
agriculture sector is now the largest sector in Kyrgyzstan but is severely
disorganized and under capitalized. Several donor projects will focus on
improving credit to the sector and there will be opportunities for small scale
operations in a variety of areas: improved seed, fertilizer, small scale farm
equipment, food and textile processing equipment, improved storage, packaging.
Light manufacturing has shown the fastest recovery in growth. There will be a
variety of niche opportunities in light manufacturing equipment on a small and
medium scale ( BISNIS, 1997).
In May 1995, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Devlopment
(EBRD) made a loan of 38 million US dollars to the Kyrgyz Energy Company to
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finance the upgrading of the electricity transmission network in the Issyk Kul area
of Kyrgyzstan (which includes the Kumtor gold mine). The project includes the
construction of a new power line to ensure a reliable supply to Kumtor and
improve the quality of the supply to other consumers in the region.  The EBRD is
also providing technical cooperation to assist in the commercialization of the
Kyrgyz Energy Company. The EBRD has advanced a US$ 30 million senior loan
and a US$ 10 million subordinated loan towards the development of the Kumtor
gold mine. In October 1995 the EBRD approved US$ 9 million for the creation of
the Kyrgyz Agribusiness Company (KAC), a private company which provides
essential agricultural input, farm equipment, storage facilities and extension
services. Four other major foreign investors in cooperation with local investors
also contributed towards the US$ 22 million total project cost.  By strengthening
intermediate markets, the project will contribute to the development of the entire
agribusiness chain (BISNIS, 1997).
Although it has many social problems, there are several reasons to invest
in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has a sustained commitment to the implementation of
market-oriented reform and macroeconomic stabilisation and has a politically
sable  environment. Kyrgyzstan has enacted about 27 bilateral agreements directly
affecting trade in goods and services, and has regional economic cooperation or
integration agreements with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia,




The five Central Asian republics have a large base of natural resources.
Independently, many of the republics are lacking in some resources.  This is one
cause of the economic crisis striking Central Asia since the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991.  These countries must now pay for previously shared resources.
Figure 3.6 shows the location of mineral resources throughout Central Asia
(ArcAtlas, 1997).  Many of these resources are located along the Amu Darya and
Syr Darya, adding to the pollution of the rivers.  Figure 3.7 shows the population
density of Central Asia.  The highest population density is along the Amu Darya
and Syr Darya also contributing to pollution.
129
Figure 3.6: Minerals in the Aral Sea basin.
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Figure 3.7: Population density in Central Asia (1 person/km2).
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Kazakstan has endured hardships since independence.  Sixty four percent
of the population live below the poverty line. The fall of birth rates and the
increase of circulatory diseases, accidents, murder, suicide and lung cancer (partly
due to Aral Sea salt in the air) has caused the absolute natural growth to decline
by 43 percent.  Half of all nurseries and kindergartens have been forced to close
due to diminished funding, and funding for education in general has been greatly
diminished.  Kazakstan has great resources including 16 billion barrels of oil.
Gold mining could prove to be very resourceful once the capital to develop the
industry is invested.   Coal-fired stations produce most of Kazakstan’s electricity,
and Kazakstan also imports 30 percent of the electricity requirements from
neighboring countries.  Ninety percent of Kazakstan’s use of the Aral Sea waters
is for agriculture.
Uzbekistan is the only Central Asia country to have had only a small drop
(18%) of GDP since independence.  Yet, 70 percent of the population lives under
the poverty line.  Uzbekistan relies heavily on the 4.2 million hectares of land (out
of 27 million hectares) it irrigates.  The increasing salinity and the high use of
fertilizers has made the water available in Uzbekistan almost unusable for
household purposes; this has increased the incidence of liver, kidney and nervous
system diseases, especially in Karakalpakstan.
Uzbekistan does have large resources in cotton, gold, and natural gas.  It’s
electric power is derived primarily from natural gas powered thermal plants with a
smaller portion coming from coal and hydroelectric power (mostly imported from
Tajikistan’s use of the Amu Darya or from its own plants on the Amu Darya).   Its
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status of the world’s fourth highest producer of cotton makes Kazakstan even
more dependable on the Amu Darya.
Eighty percent of Turkmenistan is made up of the Kara Kum desert,
making the Amu Darya its only source of water for the irrigation of the only 10
percent of total land suitable for agriculture.  Turkmenistan also uses the Amu
Darya to produce 13 billion kWh; enough for all its electricity needs, and to
export 25% of it.  Furthermore, Turkmenistan is the world’s fourth largest
producer of natural gas and it owns 64% of all Central Asian oil reserves.
Turkmenistan has a strong government which has made education a priority;
99.6% of the population is literate and secondary education is increasing.
Turkmenistan also differs from the other Central Asian countries, as its population
has increased by 2.5% per year due to high birth rates, and migration.  Women
enjoy a particularly high standing both economically and socially;  36% of
managers, 18% of Parliament, and 41% of blue and white collar workers are
women.
Tajikistan faces major difficulties; discrimination towards women and
ethnic Russians, drug and gun cartels, high unemployment of women and youth,
Islamic fundamentalists, and the dependence on Uzbekistan for all overland and
rail transport.  As the world’s third largest producer of hydroelectric power,
Tajikistan is extremely dependent on the Amu Darya water to produce 76% of its
energy requirements and $177 million in exports.  Furthermore, Tajikistan has
almost no oil and natural gas resources making it completely dependent on
hydropower for electricity and export revenues.  These export revenues are
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extremely important since Tajikistan has many times failed to pay Uzbekistan for
its import of natural gas.
Kyrgyzstan is also dependent on the Syr Darya; it owns and operates the
Toktogul Reservoir made for hydropower and for water releases.  These water
releases enable Kyrgyzstan to trade with Uzbekistan and Kazakstan for natural
gas and oil.  Kyrgyzstan has left much of the Syr Darya cascades  and gold mines
undeveloped primarily because of its lack of investment capital.  Kyrgyzstan has
many social problems.  Seventy five percent of the population lives under the
poverty line.  Many school age children are not in school.  The drop in living
standards has increased infectious diseases such as sexually transmitted diseases
and tuberculosis.  Women are finding it harder and harder to get work and women
now make up more then fifty percent of the unemployed in Kyrgyzstan (even
though women’s enrollment in university and applied science programs is  higher
than men’s).
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Chapter 4: Sharing the Aral Sea Basin Waters
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations  “recognizes that water has an economic value in all
its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good” (UN, 1997).
Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient
and equitable use and of encouraging the conservation and protection of water
resources.  It is therefore important for the five nations of the Aral Sea basin to
work together to achieve an equitable use of the basin’s waters in order to achieve
economic security and to protect the Aral Sea to the fullest extent.  The remaining
topics to be addressed in this thesis according to the Helsinki Rules are the past
utilization of the waters, the conservation, protection, development and economy
of the uses of the water resources and the cost taken to realize that affect, and the
availability of alternatives to planned or existing uses.
EFFECTS TO THE ARAL SEA ENVIRONMENT
About 97 percent of the annual water resources of the Aral Sea basin are
directly lost to field evaporation, transpiration or absorbed by plants, animals, or
to transmission problems such as pipe leaks, reservoir evaporation and discharges
of return flows into salt lakes (Klotzli, 1994).  Another problem is due to the
increase of the irrigated farming with a 100% increase in production (World
Bank, 1996). Figure 4.1 shows the different landuses of the Aral Sea basin
(ArcAtlas, 1997).  Most of the area is arable and therefore very suitable for
agriculture.  In 1988, the water usage in the Aral Sea basin for all purposes was
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125% of the annual available water resources. This value was possible because of
the return flows used downstream (Klotzli, 1994).  As the Central Asian countries
develop more stable economies, the increase in industry rather than agriculture
will help ease the demand of Aral Sea waters.
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Figure 4.1: Landuse in the Aral Sea basin (ArcAtlas, 1997).
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Environmental changes of the Aral Sea basin and adjacent territories have
taken place over the last 20 years.  Desiccation of the Aral Sea has resulted in
variations of some climatic and meteorological indices.  The climate has become
more continental.  The albedo of areas formerly occupied by the Aral Sea have
increased seven times, producing a more than threefold increase in the reflected
solar radiation the Aral Sea. Spring has arrives seven days later, while the autumn
season arrives 12 to 13 days later (UNEP, 1991).
Important consequences of water balance variations in the Aral Sea basin
include the following (UNEP, 1991):
1. A rise of the ground water table on and near irrigated massifs with
insufficient drainage as well as near canals and the main drains,
resulting in salinization and waterlogging of soils, and subsidence of
surface structures;
2. A siginificant increase in the discharge of high mineral content
drainage water to rivers. The pesticide and mineral fertilizer content of
these waters has lead to deterioration of river water quality;
3. The formation of new discharge lakes in closed depressions, to which
drainage water from irrigated massifs is discharged and lost by
evaporation and infiltration;
4. Decreased river water inflow to the lower parts of the Amu Darya and
Syr Darya deltas which leads to the disappearance of many delta lakes
5. A decrease in the river water inflow and decrease in water level in the
Aral Sea have caused a decrease in a area and volume, an increase in
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salinity, disruption of the sea ecosystems, and formation of new land
area.
It has been determined, by the UNEP, that the Aral Sea cannot be saved to
its prior grandeur.  Restoring the sea would mean stopping many hydrotechnical
systems and irrigation in the basin.  It is important, however, to prevent the
further decline of the Aral Sea so as to not further harm the surrounding
population and economy.  The first priorities are to reduce the runoff of saline
drainage waters into the rivers, and to improve the natural and social environment
in the Aral Sea basin (Murzayev, 1992).  Furthermore, irrigation techniques in the
Aral Sea basin need to be improved so that 40% of water isn’t lost to evaporation
and drainage.
PAST AND PRESENT UTILIZATION
Before the fall of the Soviet Union, the large storage reservoirs of the Aral
Sea basin functioned for irrigation and hydropower purposes. However, irrigation
use had the principal importance and therefore the reservoirs stored water to be
released during the summer vegetation season.  Since the fall of the Soviet Union
in 1991, the upstream States of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been in need of
electricity especially during the cold winter months. As discussed in Chapter 3,
this need of hydropower is due to the lack of developed oil, gas, coal and other
energy producing resources in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The downstream States,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, however, are in need of the water during
the summer months for agricultural purposes, thus leading to the conflict over
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water rights. The downstream States have therefore been exchanging their natural
gas and coal in the winter for water from the upstream states during the summer.
The Aral Sea Basin has more than 80 storage reservoirs, each having a
capacity over 10 million cubic meters.  The Syr Darya reservoirs have a total
capacity of 0.73 of the mean annual flow and are therefore large enough to
provide year to year stabilization of river flows, while the Amu Darya reservoirs
with only 0.21 total capacity of the mean annual flow, provide much less control.
The waters in 1994 were measured by the World Bank (1996), shown in
Table 4.1.  The World Bank also calculated projected outflows for the year 2010
(Table 4.2).  The continued decrease of the inflow to the Aral Sea by the year
2010 will deteriorate the economy and environment even further.  In the next 16
years, the inflow to the Aral Sea will decrease another 8% from 182 km3 to 168
km3, thereby decreasing the Aral Sea inflow another 13 km3.
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Table 4.1: Inflow to the Aral Sea basin in 1994 (km3/yr).
 Amu Darya Syr Darya Total Aral Sea Basin
Surface water inflow 80.3 41.2 121.5
Groundwater recharge 6.2 7.8 14.0
Return water 31.3 14.6 45.9
Inter-basin transfer - 1.0 1.0
Total (km3) 117.8 64.6 182.4
Diversion to agriculture 65.6 36.0 101.6
Aral Sea inflow 52.1 28.5 80.6
 
Table 4.2: Projected Inflow to the Aral Sea Basin in 2010 (km3/yr).
 Total Aral Sea Basin





Diversion to Agriculture 100.7
Aral Sea inflow 67.5
Table 4.3 lists the measured (1994) and forecasted (2010) uses of the
waters of the Aral Sea basin.  By comparing Table 4.3 to Table 4.1 , it is evident
that in 1994, which was an extremely dry year, there was a deficit of 0.5 cubic
kilometers, and the calculated deficit for 2010 is 23 cubic kilometers.  One should
note that this deficit is caused mostly by the downstream countries: Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan together produce about 75% of the water, while only consuming 10%,
and Afganistan contributes about 8% of the inflow but has not been a party to the
Aral Sea Programs because of its political instability.
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4.2 3.3 7.5 10.6
Unused discharge of
vertical drainage
1.6 1.0 2.6 4.0
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1.0 - 1.0 1.0
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economic sectors
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21.7 9.8 31.5 19.0
Total uses (km3) 117.1 65.8 182.9 191.2
 
 Water demands in Central Asia are dominated by the needs of agriculture,
accounting for 92 percent of the total use.  Industrial production requires 2 percent
of the water demand, municipal use accounts for 3 percent, and the remaining 3%
are required for rural water supply, fisheries and other miscellaneous uses
(Anderson, 1997).  Table 4.4 shows the shares of water in each sector for each
country in Central Asia.  Uzbekistan uses over half of the Aral Sea basin waters,
while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan use less than 10%.
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Table 4.4: Uses of water in the Aral Sea basin, km3/yr (World Bank, 1996).
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kazakstan
Agricultural Water Use 4.9 10.3 23.3 53.4 9.7
Irrigation (%) 96.7 86.0 97.7 91.2 89.0
Rural Water Supply(%) 1.6 5.2 0.2 1.6 1.2
Industrial Use 0.1 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.2
Other Uses 0.2 3.0 0.5 5.3 1.0
Total Water Use (km3) 5.1 13.3 23.8 58.6 10.9
Agricultural water demands have mainly increased since 1950 because of
the massive extension of the irrigation area.  Transmission systems have many
“built-on-sand canals” which account for a large portion of water losses, and
irrigation system efficiencies are very low throughout Central Asia.  Cotton plants
(37% of the agricultural production) necessitate about 0.8 to 1.0 meters per year
of water in Central Asia. However, other regions in the world have been able to
produce 6 to 7 times more cotton with the same amount of water by using water-
saving techniques (Klotzli, 1991).
Of the 155 million hectares of land resources in the Aral Sea Basin, only
33 million are considered suitable for irrigation while about 7.9 million hectares
are actually irrigated.  Rain-fed agriculture, which is mostly pasture and hay,
occupies about 54 million hectares. It is an important goal to increase the
production of the rain-fed areas. Cotton, whose production share decreased by 8%
from 1990 to 1994 to 37%, still dominates irrigated agriculture. Meanwhile, the
cereals have increased to 26% and fodder crops have decreased to 23 %. The high
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costs of gasoline and chemical fertilizers, and disrupted markets have caused the
levels of both yields and production of major corps such as cotton, cereal, maize,
in irrigated farming to decrease by 5% since 1990 to 40% (UNEP, 1991).
Hydropower produces 35% of electricity in Central Asia, thanks to natural
conditions such as waterfalls.  Industrial water demand in the Syr Darya is 12% of
the total water demand, while it is only 6% in the Amu Darya.
Since irrigated agriculture makes up 92% of the basin water use, it is
important to understand which countries use the most water for agricultural
purposes. The pie chart below illustrates the agricultural use of water in the Aral
Sea Basin (see also Table 4.4).  Since irrigation uses consume almost 92% of the
Aral Sea basin waters, the shares of water for irrigation are a good indicator of
which country consumes the most.  As can be seen, Uzebekistan, whose Aral Sea
Basin population is over 22 million people, uses over half the water.
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Figure 4.2: Present share of agricultural water in the Aral Sea basin.
 Future uses of the water should also be considered. Each country has
calculated the amount of land which can be irrigated after installing new irrigation
methods by the year 2010.  Table 4.5 shows that by the year 2010 only









Table 4.5: Documented irrigation (1994) and projected (2010) water use (World
Bank, 1996).
Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Kazakstan
Irrigation Water Use (1994) km3 4.9 10.3 23.3 53.4 9.7
Irrigation Water Use (2010) km3 7.8 10.3 25.2 48.0 9.4
 
EXISTING TREATIES
The Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) has worked
on establishing an approach for limiting water consumption in the Amu Darya and
Syr Darya, and on a common strategy for transboundary water resources
management.  The ICWC has also worked on establishing water allocations to
each country so that the waters are used to their fullest capacity.  Figure 4.3 shows
the allocations the ICWC has given to each country.  The water surplus,
calculated according to the GIS model, is also shown in contrast to the water
consumption in the Aral Sea basin.  The ICWC allocates more water than is
produced to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, who irrigate the largest amount of
land, 1.7 million hectares and 4.2 million hectares, respectively.
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On September 12, 1997, the four countries of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement on the use of the Syr Darya
waters.  This agreement occurred recognizing these countries had lived together
for many generations.  They therefore have common interests in developing
efficient and coordinated water regime in the Syr Darya Basin taking into account
the many environmental problems of the Aral Sea.  The agreement is based on the
proposed management and maintenance of the five reservoirs, Toktogul,
Kairakum, Charvak, Chardarya, and Andizhan, found in the Syr Darya basins.
Article IV of this agreement declares that there will be compensation for
energy loss as a result of their reduction of releases during the non-vegetative
period (winter months).  Compensation will be made using energy resources such
as coal, gas, and electricity or their monetary equivalents.  A tariff will be
included in these exchanges based on costs of operation, maintenance and
reconstruction of hydrotechnical facilities.
The treaty also declares that the four nations will seek agreement on the
construction of new hydropower facilities, and promote the use of monetary
exchange as a replacement for current energy exchanges.  They also agree to
reduce the amount of pollutions released to the river, and to develop water saving
technologies.
The agreement is as follows: Kyrgyzstan receives 1.1 billion kWh of
power in electricity or coal, valued at $22 million, and 400 million kWh of power
plus 500 million cubic meters of gas, valued at $48.5 million, from Kazakstan and
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Uzbekistan, respectively.  In return Kyrgyzstan delivers 3.25 cubic kilometers of
water from the Toktogul Reservoir in monthly flows and 1.1 billion kWh of
summer hydroelectric power to both Kazakstan and Uzbekistan (Keith &
McKinney, 1997).
Because Kazakstan and Uzbekistan benefit from timely water releases
from Kyrgyz dams, it is fair that they pay for part of the maintenance and
operation of the dams.  The economies of these three countries are closely
interrelated, and it is therefore important that they share natural resources.
However, the fact that Uzbekistan pays more than Kazakstan for the same amount
water and power could be disputed.  Furthermore, is it fair that Uzbekistan and
Kazakstan pay for the maintenance and operation of the dam plus pay for the
water releases?
Amu Darya Basin
The biggest canal in Central Asia, the Karakum Canal, diverts 500 cubic
meters per second from the middle of the Amu Darya to Turkmenistan.  About 33
percent of the water used for irrigation in Turkmenistan percolates through the
sandy soils of the canal.  Furthermore, seepage losses are so enormous that they
have created a  800 square kilometer lake alongside the Karakum canal.
Tajikistan exports 3.4 billion kWh ($170 million) of hydroelectric power
to Uzbekistan from the Amu Darya dams.  Tajikistan in exchange imports 3
billion kWh ($130 million) of electricity per year from Uzbekistan in the form of
natural gas (BISNIS, 1997).
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Figure 4.4 shows the water allocations of each country and the trade of
resources between the countries.  Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan produce
hydroelectric power which they trade along with water for coal and natural gas.
The Amu Darya does not flow within the borders of Kyrgyzstan, however, the
ICWC allocates 0.15 km3 per year of Amu Darya water to Kyrgyzstan.  By
allocating Amu Darya water to Kyrgyzstan, the ICWC is able to alleviate some of
the demand on the Syr Darya.
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Figure 4.4: Exchange of resources in the Aral Sea basin.
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ANALYSIS OF THE HELSINKI RULES
The Helsinki Rules have 11 main factors in determining water rights, of
which seven have been analyzed throughout the preceding chapters; The extent of
the drainage area in the territory of each basin State, the contribution of water by
each basin State, the past utilization of the waters of the basin, the economic and
social needs of each basin State, the population dependent on the waters of the
basin in each basin State, and the availability of other resources.  Table 4.6
classifies each country on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the strongest or best and 5
being the weakest or worst, when applied to the Helsinki Rules factors.  It should
be noted that classifying or ranking is a difficult task and many rankings could be
argued as ties.  The results show that the least dependent country on the Aral Sea
basin is Turkmenistan, and the most dependent is Uzbekistan.
Table 4.6: Helsinki Rules ranking of each country (1= best, 5= worst).
Kazakstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan
Watershed extent 3 5 4 2 1
Water Surplus Contribution 3 2 1 5 4
Social/Population independence 3 1 2 4 5
Economic independence 2 4 5 1 3
Optimization of water 4 1 2 3 5
Availability of other resources 2 4 5 1 3
Total score 17 17 19 16 21
4
The watershed extent and water surplus contribution are based on the GIS
analysis in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.18, respectively.  The results for the watershed
extent show how hard it is to classify: Uzbekistan has 1% more of the watershed
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than Turkmenistan, while Turkmenistan has 5% more of the watershed, yet the
rankings differ only by one point.
The social and population independence of each country from the Aral Sea
basin are based on the amount of irrigated land; the larger the area, the larger
amount of population is affected.  Uzbekistan irrigates over 4.2 million hectares
of land, thereby affecting a greatest amount of people.  Furthermore, the
population in Uzbekistan’ region of Karakalpakstan is the most affected by the
pollution and drying of the Aral Sea basin: The degradation of health near the
Aral Sea is the most poignant dependence on the Aral Sea waters.  Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan are rated as the most socially independent countries due to their
small amount of irrigated.  It could easily argued, however, that the Kyrgyz and
Tajiks are the most dependent on the Aral Sea basin due to their dependence on
hydroelectric power as a form of electricity during the harsh winter months.
Economic independence is based on each country's GDP and the GDP’s
dependence on water resources.  Turkmenistan is ranked the most independent
because although it irrigates a large amount of land, agriculture only makes up
11% of the GDP, while industries make up 81%.  Tajikistan ranked the lowest for
economic independence; Although the amount of its GDP based on agriculture is
low, it depends on the hydroelectric power as its most lucrative industry, and on
the trading of water as an exchange for other natural resources.  The same is true
for Kyrgyzstan.
The optimization of water is dependent on how the country's use and
optimization of available water.  The downstream countries scored the lowest for
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water optimizing because of their outdated irrigation techniques.  These
techniques, dating back to Soviet times, have some of the largest evaporation and
infiltration rates in Central Asia.  Many canals, like in Turkmenistan, have been
made improperly causing water leaks and small lakes.  Uzbekistan ranked the
lowest due to its government agency, the MFER, subsidizing farmer’s crops, no
matter the price of the input nor the output, and therefore indirectly discouraging
farmers from lowering water consumption.
Finally, Turkmenistan ranked the highest on the availability of other
resources due to its oil and natural reserves.  Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan scored the
lowest due to their extreme dependence on hydroelectric power as their only real
power producing resource.
The true result of Table 4.6 is that the Helsinki Rules are hard to apply to
real circumstances.  The Helsinki Convention state that all factors are to be
weighed equally, but ranking or classifying countries according to these factors is
not discussed.  Classifying a country as more or less needy, dependent,
independent, poor or rich is not an easy task, and therefore shows the





The GIS analysis of the spatial hydrology of the Aral Sea was conclusive
and dependable.  The amount of time necessary to do a spatial hydrologic study of
a region without actually going "on the field" is one of GIS’s best characteristics.
The work accomplished through GIS for this thesis includes the following:
• Watershed and water stream delineation,
• Calculation of evaporation,
• Calculation of water surplus,
• Addition of snowmelt into the water surplus calculation,
• Percent of watershed,
• Percent of water surplus.
An advantage of using GIS is its reliability.  Table 2.1 illustrates that
documented values were only 0.2 to 6.2 percent greater than the calculated values
of watershed extent.  The documented values were gathered in 1989 at which time
the water extent might have been greater than today, thereby justifying the smaller
GIS values.  The simple snowmelt program to calculate water surplus was
beneficial.  Table 2.2 shows the difference in using snowmelt for water surplus




Further work could be done in the GIS study of the Aral Sea basin to
increase the dependability of the water surplus values.
This work should include the following:
• Evaporation calculations should include a better understanding of how
infiltration and evaporation occur on rock and glaciers.
• Runoff coefficients should be added for a better estimate of the water
surplus.
• Snowpack values and the cycle of glacier melt should be included for a
better estimate of snowmelt.
• Radiation should also be included for its effect on snowmelt.
• Water discharge used for irrigation should be used to calculate a
complete water balance.
HELSINKI RULES
The Helsinki Rules were drafted by the United Nations without much
consideration on how to apply the Convention to real situations.  Although the
Helsinki Rules have been quoted and cited by many nations in water disputes, its
analysis in a particular circumstance had never been attempted before.
Analysis of the Helsinki Rules
The Helsinki Rules proved to be vague in determining water rights.
Although the 12 points cited as factors in determining water rights are applicable
to any situation, it is difficult to determine and to scale different degrees and
ranges of economic, social, and population dependence on the Aral Sea waters.
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Furthermore, the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin
States, the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied without
causing substantial injury to a co-basin, and the comparative costs of alternative
means of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin state are
extremely hard to study and answer.
The economic, social, environmental, and hydrological status of each Aral
Sea basin country was analyzed and classified in Table 4.6.  Table 4.6 clearly
shows the difficulty of applying the Helsinki Rules to a case study.  Ranking or
classifying one country as more or less economically dependent relies on more
than just GDP or employment numbers.  Is water irrigation as a means of
employment more "important" than water as a mean of producing electricity for
cold winter months?   It can be argued that without electricity, the population may
literally freeze to death, as it can be argued that without work the population may
have no money to pay for shelter or for food thereby literally dying of starvation.
The importance of one industry over another is as subjective as the dependence of
one country’s economy on the Aral Sea basin over another, making the Helsinki
Rules extremely hard to enforce.
The only nonsubjective factor in the Helsinki Rules is the hydrological
analysis, and can therefore be applied to determine water rights.  Furthermore, a
broad analysis of each country’s economic and social status can be applied
without "ranking" or penalizing other countries.
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Applying the Helsinki Rules
The upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are extremely
dependent on the Amu Darya and Syr Darya.  Without these waters, the upstream
countries could not create the hydroelectric power which is essential due to their
lack of other energy producing resources such as oil and natural gas. The
downstream countries of the Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also need
the Syr Darya and Amu Darya; not for energy but for agriculture.  Considering
that the hydrology of the Aral Sea basin is "equal", i.e. the greatest extent of the
watersheds is in the downstream countries, while the upstream countries produce
the greatest amount of water runoff, the five Aral Sea countries should share the
water.
The water should be shared so that the upstream countries can create
hydropower during the winter months, and be compensated for water releases for
downstream countries through the exchange of hard currency of fuel (natural gas
or oil).  Since the five countries are to share the waters, the operation and
maintenance of hydrotechnical facilities should also be shared, with the greater
contribution from the upstream countries.  Because the downstream countries of
Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and Turkmenistan are the largest consumers of water and
consume much more than their “share”, the upstream countries should be
compensated for releasing more water.  Therefore, the concept of the upstream
countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan releasing water in exchange for natural gas
and oil can be considered as fair.
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It can be concluded that there should be equal sharing of the Aral Sea
waters.  In the event, that a country needs more than its share of water, the other
countries should be compensated with other natural resources.  However, this
equal sharing or compensation should not precede the proper treatment of the Aral
Sea basin.  As water inflow to the Aral Sea continues to drop, it is of utmost
importance that each of the Central Asian countries does its best to minimize and
optimize its use of the Aral Sea waters.
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Appendices
APPENDIX A:THE HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS (SOURCE: MFA)
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
Article I
The general rules of international law as set forth in these chapters are applicable
to the use of the waters of an international drainage basin except as may be
provided otherwise by convention, agreement or binding custom among the basin
States.
Article II
An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending over two or more
States determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including
surface and underground waters, flowing into a common terminus.
Article III
A "basin State" is a State the territory of which includes a portion of an
international drainage basin.
CHAPTER 2. EQUITABLE UTILIZATION OF THE WATERS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASIN
Article IV
Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article V
I. What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of article IV to be
determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
II. Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area
in the territory of each basin State;
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The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by
each basin State;
The climate affecting the basin;
The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization;
The economic and social needs of each basin State;
The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social
needs of each basin State;
The availability of other resources;
The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;
The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a
means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin State.
III. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in
comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is reasonable
and equitable share, all relevant factors are to be considered together and a
conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
Article VI
A use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference over any other
use or category of uses.
Article VII
A basin State may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an
international drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State a future use of such
waters.
Article VIII
An existing reasonable use may continue in operation unless the factors justifying
its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it be
modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.
(a) A use that is in fact operational is deemed to have been an existing use from
the time of the initiation of construction directly related to the use or, where such
construction is not required, the undertaking of comparable acts of actual
implementation.
(b) Such a use continues to be an existing use until such time as it is discontinued
with the intention that it be abandoned.
A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational it




As used in this chapter, the term "water pollution" refers to any detrimental
change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or
quality of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article X
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an
international drainage basin, a State:
(a) Must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of
existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause
substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State;
(b) Should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in an
international drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial damage is caused
in the territory of a co-basin State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this article applies to water pollution
originating:
(a) Within a territory of the State, or
(b) Outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State’s conduct.
Article XI
In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph 1 (a) of article X of this
chapter, the State responsible shall be required to cease the wrongful conduct and
compensate the injured co-basin State for the injury that has been caused to it.
In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph 1 (b) of article X, if a State
fails to take reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter into
negotiations with the injured State with a view towards reaching a settlement
equitable under the circumstances.
CHAPTER 4 . NAVIGATION (Articles XII-XX)
CHAPTER 5. TIMBER FLOATING (ArticlesXXI-XXV)
CHAPTER 6. PROCEDURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article XXVI
This chapter relates to procedures for the prevention and settlement of
international disputes as to the legal rights or other interests of basin States and of
other States in the waters of an international drainage basin.
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Article XXVII
Consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, States are under an
obligation to settle international disputes as to their legal rights or other interests
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and
justice are not endangered.
It is recommended that States resort progressively to the means of prevention and
settlement of disputes stipulated in articles XXIX to XXXIV of this chapter.
Article XXVIII
1. States are under a primary obligation to resort to means of prevention and
settlement of disputes stipulated in the applicable treaties binding upon them.
2. States are limited to the means of prevention and settlement of disputes
stipulated in treaties binding upon them only to the extent provided by the
applicable treaties.
Article XXIX
With a view to preventing disputes from arising between basin States as to their
legal rights or other interest, it is recommended that each basin State furnish
relevant and reasonably available information to the other basin States concerning
the waters of a drainage basin within its territory and its use of, and activities with
respect to, such waters.
A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish
to any other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected,
notice of any proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime
of the basin in a way which might give rise to a dispute as defined in article
XXVI. The notice should include such essential facts as will permit the recipient
to make an assessment of the probable effect of the proposed alteration.
A State providing the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this article should afford
the recipient a reasonable period of time to make an assessment of the probable
effect of the proposed construction or installation and to submit its views thereon
to the State furnishing the notice.
If a State has failed to give the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, the
alteration by the State in the regime of the drainage basin shall not be given the
weight normally accorded to temporal priority in use in the event of a
determination of what is a reasonable and equitable share of the waters of the
basin.
Article XXX
In case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other interests, as
defined in article XXVI, they should seek a solution by negotiation..
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Article XXXI
If a question or dispute arises which relates to the present or future utilization of
the waters of an international drainage basin, it is recommended that the basin
States refer the question or dispute to a joint agency and that they request the
agency to survey the international drainage basin and to formulate plans or
recommendations for the fullest and most efficient use thereof in the interests of
all such States.
It is recommended that the joint agency be instructed to submit reports on all
matters within its competence to the appropriate authorities of the member States
concerned.
It is recommended that the member States of the joint agency in appropriate cases
invite non-basin States which by treaty enjoy a right in the use of the waters of an
international drainage basin to associate themselves with the work of the joint
agency or that they be permitted to appear before the agency.
Article XXXII
If a question or a dispute is one which is considered by the States concerned to be
incapable of resolution in the manner set forth in article XXXI, it is recommended
that they seek the good offices, or jointly request the mediation of a third State, of
a qualified international organization or of a qualified person.
Article XXXIII
1. If the States concerned have not been able to resolve their dispute through
negotiation or have been unable to agree on the measures described in articles
XXXI and XXXII, it is recommended that they form a commission of inquiry or
an ad hoc conciliation commission, which shall endeavor to find a solution, likely
to be accepted by the States concerned, of any dispute as to their legal rights.
2. It is recommended that the conciliation commission be constituted in the
manner set forth in the annex.
Article XXXIV
It is recommended that the States concerned agree to submit their legal disputes to
an ad hoc arbitral tribunal, to a permanent arbitral tribunal or to the International
Court of Justice if:
(a) A commission has not been formed as provided in article XXXIII, or
(b) The commission has not been able to find a solution to be recommended, or
(c) A solution recommendedhas not been accepted by the States concerned, and
(d) An agreement has not been otherwise arrived at.
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Article XXXV
It is recommended that in the event of arbitration the States concerned have
recourse to the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure prepared by the International
Law Commission of the United Nations at its tenth session b/in 1958.
Article XXXVI
Recourse to arbitration implies the undertaking by the States concerned to
consider the award to be given as final and to submit in good faith to its
execution.
Article XXXVII
The means of settlement referred to in the preceding articles of this chapter are
without prejudice to the utilization of means of settlement recommended to, or
required of, members of regional arrangements or agencies and of other
international organizations.
a/ Adopted by the International Law Association at the fifty-second conference,
held at Helsinki in August 1966. Report of the Committee on the Uses of the
Waters of International Rivers (London, International Law Association, 1967).
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APPENDIX B: CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES
OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES ADOPTED BY THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY MAY 1997
The Parties to the present Convention,  Conscious of the importance of
international watercourses and the non-navigational uses thereof in many regions
of the world, Having in mind Article 13, paragraph 1 (a), of the Charter of the
United Nations, which provides that the General Assembly shall initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purpose of encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification, Considering that successful
codification and progressive development of rules of international law regarding
non-navigational uses of international watercourses would assist in promoting and
implementing the purposes and principles set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the
Charter of the United Nations, Taking into account the problems affecting many
international watercourses resulting from, among other things, increasing
demands and pollution, Expressing the conviction that a framework convention
will ensure the utilization, development, conservation, management and
protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and
sustainable utilization thereof for present and future generations Affirming the
importance of international cooperation and good neighbourliness in this field,
Aware of the special situation and needs of developing countries, Recalling the
principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21,
Recalling also the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding the
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, Mindful of the valuable
contribution of international organizations, both governmental and non-
governmental, to the codification and progressive development of international
law in this field, Appreciative of the work carried out by the International Law
Commission on the law of the non-navigational uses of international
watercourses, Bearing in mind United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/52




Scope of the present Convention
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1. The present Convention applies to uses of international watercourses
and of their waters for purposes other than navigation and to measures of
protection, preservation and management related to the uses of those watercourses
and their waters.
The uses of international watercourses for navigation is not within the
scope of the present Convention except insofar as other uses affect navigation or
are affected by navigation.
Article 2
Use of terms
For the purposes of the present Convention:
"Watercourse" means a system of surface waters and groundwaters
constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally
flowing into a common terminus;
"International watercourse" means a watercourse, parts of which are
situated in different States;
"Watercourse State" means a State Party to the present Convention in
whose territory part of an international watercourse is situated, or a Party that is a
regional economic integration organization, in the territory of one or more of
whose Member States part of an international watercourse is situated;
"Regional economic integration organization" means an organization
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have
transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention and
which has been duly authorized in accordance with its internal procedures, to
sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it.
Article 3
Watercourse agreements
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, nothing in the present
Convention shall affect the rights or obligations of a watercourse State arising
from agreements in force for it on the date on which it became a party to the
present Convention.
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1, parties to agreements
referred to in paragraph 1 may, where necessary, consider harmonizing such
agreements with the basic principles of the present Convention.
Watercourse States may enter into one or more agreements, hereinafter
referred to as "watercourse agreements", which apply and adjust the provisions of
the present Convention to the characteristics and uses of a particular international
watercourse or part thereof.
Where a watercourse agreement is concluded between two or more
watercourse States, it shall define the waters to which it applies. Such an
agreement may be entered into with respect to an entire international watercourse
or any part thereof or a particular project programme or use except insofar as the
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agreement adversely affects, to a significant extent, the use by one or more other
watercourse States of the waters of the watercourse, without their express consent.
Where a watercourse State considers that adjustment and application of
the provisions of the present Convention is required because of the characteristics
and uses of a particular international watercourse, watercourse States shall consult
with a view to negotiating in good faith for the purpose of concluding a
watercourse agreement or agreements.
Where some but not all watercourse States to a particular international
watercourse are parties to an agreement, nothing in such agreement shall affect
the rights or obligations under the present Convention of watercourse States that
are not parties to such an agreement.
Article 4
Parties to watercourse agreements
1. Every watercourse State is entitled to participate in the negotiation of
and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire
international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.
2. A watercourse State whose use of an international watercourse may be
affected to a significant extent by the implementation of a proposed watercourse
agreement that applies only to a part of the watercourse or to a particular project,
programme or use is entitled to participate in consultations on such an agreement
and, where appropriate, in the negotiation thereof in good faith with a view to
becoming a party thereto, to the extent that its use is thereby affected.
 
PART II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Article 5
Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an
international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with
a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits
therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned,
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and
protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.
Such participation includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty
to cooperate in the protection and development thereof, as provided in the present
Convention.
Article 6
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization
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1. Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all
relevant factors and circumstances, including:
Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other
factors of a natural character;
The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
The population dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State;
The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State
on other watercourse States;
Existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water
resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;
The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular
planned or existing use.
2. In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this article, watercourse
States concerned shall, when the need arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of
cooperation.
3. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what
is a reasonable and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered together
and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole.
Article 7
Obligation not to cause significant harm
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in
their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant
harm to other watercourse States.
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse
State, the States whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to
such use, take all appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of
articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate
such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.
Article 8
General obligation to cooperate
1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality,
territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.
In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may
consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures
in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms
and commissions in various regions.
Article 9
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Regular exchange of data and information
1. Pursuant to article 8, watercourse States shall on a regular basis
exchange readily available data and information on the condition of the
watercourse, in particular that of a hydrological, meteorological, hydrogeological
and ecological nature and related to the water quality as well as related forecasts.
2. If a watercourse State is requested by another watercourse State to
provide data or information that is not readily available, it shall employ its best
efforts to comply with the request but may condition its compliance upon
payment by the requesting State of the reasonable costs of collecting and, where
appropriate, processing such data or information.
3. Watercourse States shall employ their best efforts to collect and, where
appropriate, to process data and information in a manner which facilitates its
utilization by the other watercourse States to which it is communicated.
Article 10
Relationship between different kinds of uses
1. In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an
international watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses.
2. In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse,
it shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being
given to the requirements of vital human needs.
 
PART III. PLANNED MEASURES
Article 11
Information concerning planned measures
Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and,
if necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the
condition of an international watercourse.
Article 12
Notification concerning planned measures with possible adverse effects
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of
planned measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other
watercourse States, it shall provide those States with timely notification thereof.
Such notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and
information, including the results of any environmental impact assessment, in
order to enable the notified States to evaluate the possible effects of the planned
measures.
Article 13
Period for reply to notification
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Unless otherwise agreed:
(a) A watercourse State providing a notification under article 12 shall
allow the notified States a period of six months within which to study and
evaluate the possible effects of the planned measures and to communicate the
findings to it;
(b) This period shall, at the request of a notified State for which the
evaluation of the planned measures poses special difficulty, be extended for a
period of six months.
Article 14
Obligations of the notifying State during the period for reply
During the period referred to in article 13, the notifying State:
(a) Shall cooperate with the notified States by providing them, on request,
with any additional data and information that is available and necessary for an
accurate evaluation; and
(b) Shall not implement or permit the implementation of the planned
measures without the consent of the notified States.
Article 15
Reply to notification
The notified States shall communicate their findings to the notifying State
as early as possible within the period applicable pursuant to article 13. If a
notified State finds that implementation of the planned measures would be
inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, it shall attach to its finding a
documented explanation setting forth the reasons for the finding.
Article 16
Absence of reply to notification
1. If, within the period applicable pursuant to article 13, the notifying State
receives no communication under article 15, it may, subject to its obligations
under articles 5 and 7, proceed with the implementation of the planned measures,
in accordance with the notification and any other data and information provided to
the notified States.
2. Any claim to compensation by a notified State which has failed to reply
within the period applicable pursuant to article 13 may be offset by the costs
incurred by the notifying State for action undertaken after the expiration of the
time for a reply which would not have been undertaken if the notified State had
objected within that period.
Article 17
Consultations and negotiations concerning planned measures
1. If a communication is made under article 15 that implementation of the
planned measures would be inconsistent with the provisions of articles 5 or 7, the
notifying State and the State making the communication shall enter into
consultations and, if necessary, negotiations with a view to arriving at an
equitable resolution of the situation.
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2. The consultations and negotiations shall be conducted on the basis that
each State must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the rights and legitimate
interests of the other State.
3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the notifying
State shall, if so requested by the notified State at the time it makes the
communication, refrain from implementing or permitting the implementation of
the planned measures for a period of six months unless otherwise agreed.
Article 18
Procedures in the absence of notification
1. If a watercourse State has reasonable grounds to believe that another
watercourse State is planning measures that may have a significant adverse effect
upon it, the former State may request the latter to apply the provisions of article
12. The request shall be accompanied by a documented explanation setting forth
its grounds.
2. In the event that the State planning the measures nevertheless finds that
it is not under an obligation to provide a notification under article 12, it shall so
inform the other State, providing a documented explanation setting forth the
reasons for such finding. If this finding does not satisfy the other State, the two
States shall, at the request of that other State, promptly enter into consultations
and negotiations in the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17.
3. During the course of the consultations and negotiations, the State
planning the measures shall, if so requested by the other State at the time it
requests the initiation of consultations and negotiations, refrain from
implementing or permitting the implementation of those measures for a period of
six months unless otherwise agreed.
Article 19
Urgent implementation of planned measures
1. In the event that the implementation of planned measures is of the
utmost urgency in order to protect public health, public safety or other equally
important interests, the State planning the measures may, subject to articles 5 and
7, immediately proceed to implementation, notwithstanding the provisions of
article 14 and paragraph 3 of article 17.
2. In such case, a formal declaration of the urgency of the measures shall
be communicated without delay to the other watercourse States referred to in
article 12 together with the relevant data and information.
3. The State planning the measures shall, at the request of any of the States
referred to in paragraph 2, promptly enter into consultations and negotiations with
it in the manner indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 17.
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PART IV. PROTECTION, PRESERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
Article 20
Protection and preservation of ecosystems
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly,
protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses.
Article 21
Prevention, reduction and control of pollution
1. For the purpose of this article, "pollution of an international
watercourse" means any detrimental alteration in the composition or quality of the
waters of an international watercourse which results directly or indirectly from
human conduct.
2. Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly,
prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may
cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment,
including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any
beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse. Watercourse
States shall take steps to harmonize their policies in this connection.
Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, consult with a
view to arriving at mutually agreeable measures and methods to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of an international watercourse, such as:
(a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria;
(b) Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point
and non-point sources;
(c) Establishing lists of substances the introduction of which into the
waters of an international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or
monitored.
Article 22
Introduction of alien or new species
Watercourse States shall take all measures necessary to prevent the
introduction of species, alien or new, into an international watercourse which may
have effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse resulting in
significant harm to other watercourse States.
Article 23
Protection and preservation of the marine environment
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, in
cooperation with other States, take all measures with respect to an international
watercourse that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment,





1. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into
consultations concerning the management of an international watercourse, which
may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism.
2. For the purposes of this article, "management" refers, in particular, to:
(a) Planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse
and providing for the implementation of any plans adopted; and
(b) Otherwise promoting the rational and optimal utilization, protection




1. Watercourse States shall cooperate, where appropriate, to respond to
needs or opportunities for regulation of the flow of the waters of an international
watercourse.
2. Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse States shall participate on an
equitable basis in the construction and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of
such regulation works as they may have agreed to undertake.
3. For the purposes of this article, "regulation" means the use of hydraulic
works or any other continuing measure to alter, vary or otherwise control the flow
of the waters of an international watercourse.
Article 26
Installations
1. Watercourse States shall, within their respective territories, employ their
best efforts to maintain and protect installations, facilities and other works related
to an international watercourse.
2. Watercourse States shall, at the request of any of them which has
reasonable grounds to believe that it may suffer significant adverse effects, enter
into consultations with regard to:
(a) The safe operation and maintenance of installations, facilities or other
works related to an international watercourse; and
(b) The protection of installations, facilities or other works from wilful or
negligent acts or the forces of nature.
 
PART V. HARMFUL CONDITIONS AND EMERGENCY SITUATIONS
Article 27
Prevention and mitigation of harmful conditions
Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, take
all appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate conditions related to an
international watercourse that may be harmful to other watercourse States,
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whether resulting from natural causes or human conduct, such as flood or ice




1. For the purposes of this article, "emergency" means a situation that
causes, or poses an imminent threat of causing, serious harm to watercourse States
or other States and that results suddenly from natural causes, such as floods, the
breaking up of ice, landslides or earthquakes, or from human conduct, such as
industrial accidents.
2. A watercourse State shall, without delay and by the most expeditious
means available, notify other potentially affected States and competent
international organizations of any emergency originating within its territory.
3. A watercourse State within whose territory an emergency originates
shall, in cooperation with potentially affected States and, where appropriate,
competent international organizations, immediately take all practicable measures
necessitated by the circumstances to prevent, mitigate and eliminate harmful
effects of the emergency.
4. When necessary, watercourse States shall jointly develop contingency
plans for responding to emergencies, in cooperation, where appropriate, with
other potentially affected States and competent international organizations.
 
PART VI. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Article 29
International watercourses and installations in time of armed conflict
International watercourses and related installations, facilities and other
works shall enjoy the protection accorded by the principles and rules of
international law applicable in international and non-international armed conflict
and shall not be used in violation of those principles and rules.
Article 30
Indirect procedures
In cases where there are serious obstacles to direct contacts between
watercourse States, the States concerned shall fulfil their obligations of
cooperation provided for in the present Convention, including exchange of data
and information, notification, communication, consultations and negotiations,
through any indirect procedure accepted by them.
Article 31
Data and information vital to national defence or security
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Nothing in the present Convention obliges a watercourse State to provide
data or information vital to its national defence or security. Nevertheless, that
State shall cooperate in good faith with the other watercourse States with a view
to providing as much information as possible under the circumstances.
Article 32
Non-discrimination
Unless the watercourse States concerned have agreed otherwise for the
protection of the interests of persons, natural or juridical, who have suffered or are
under a serious threat of suffering significant transboundary harm as a result of
activities related to an international watercourse, a watercourse State shall not
discriminate on the basis of nationality or residence or place where the injury
occurred, in granting to such persons, in accordance with its legal system, access
to judicial or other procedures, or a right to claim compensation or other relief in
respect of significant harm caused by such activities carried on in its territory.
Article 33
Settlement of disputes
1. In the event of a dispute between two or more Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of the present Convention, the Parties concerned
shall, in the absence of an applicable agreement between them, seek a settlement
of the dispute by peaceful means in accordance with the following provisions.
2. If the Parties concerned cannot reach agreement by negotiation
requested by one of them, they may jointly seek the good offices of, or request
mediation or conciliation by, a third party, or make use, as appropriate, of any
joint watercourse institutions that may have been established by them or agree to
submit the dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice.
3. Subject to the operation of paragraph 10, if after six months from the
time of the request for negotiations referred to in paragraph 2, the Parties
concerned have not been able to settle their dispute through negotiation or any
other means referred to in paragraph 2, the dispute shall be submitted, at the
request of any of the parties to the dispute, to impartial fact-finding in accordance
with paragraphs 4 to 9, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
A Fact-finding Commission shall be established, composed of one
member nominated by each Party concerned and in addition a member not having
the nationality of any of the Parties concerned chosen by the nominated members
who shall serve as Chairman.
5. If the members nominated by the Parties are unable to agree on a
Chairman within three months of the request for the establishment of the
Commission, any Party concerned may request the Secretary-General of the
United Nations to appoint the Chairman who shall not have the nationality of any
of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned.
If one of the Parties fails to nominate a member within three months of the initial
request pursuant to paragraph 3, any other Party concerned may request the
176
Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a person who shall not have
the nationality of any of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the
watercourse concerned. The person so appointed shall constitute a single-member
Commission.
6. The Commission shall determine its own procedure.
7. The Parties concerned have the obligation to provide the Commission
with such information as it may require and, on request, to permit the
Commission to have access to their respective territory and to inspect any
facilities, plant, equipment, construction or natural feature relevant for the
purpose of its inquiry.
8. The Commission shall adopt its report by a majority vote, unless it is a
single-member Commission, and shall submit that report to the Parties concerned
setting forth its findings and the reasons therefor and such recommendations as it
deems appropriate for an equitable solution of the dispute, which the Parties
concerned shall consider in good faith.
9. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the Parties
concerned
10. When ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the present
Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party which is not a regional economic
integration organization may declare in a written instrument submitted to the
Depositary that, in respect of any dispute not resolved in accordance with
paragraph 2, it recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement
in relation to any Party accepting the same obligation:
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice; and/or
(b) Arbitration by an arbitral tribunal established and operating, ’unless the
parties to the dispute otherwise agreed, in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the annex to the present Convention.
A Party which is a regional economic integration organization may make a
declaration with like effect in relation to arbitration in accordance with
subparagraph (b).
 
PART VII. FINAL CLAUSES
Article 34
Signature
The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States and by
regional economic integration organizations from ... until ... at United Nations
Headquarters in New York.
Article 35
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Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. The present Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession by States and by regional economic integration organizations. The
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party
to this Convention without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound
by all the obligations under the Convention. In the case of such organizations, one
or more of whose member States is a Party to this Convention, the organization
and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the
performance of their obligations under the Convention. In such cases, the
organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under
the Convention concurrently.
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession,
the regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their
competence with respect to the matters governed by the Convention. These
organizations shall also inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of
any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.
Article 36
Entry into force
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day
following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
2. For each State or regional economic integration organization that
ratifies, accepts or approves the Convention or accedes thereto after the deposit of
the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the
Convention shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the deposit by such
State or regional economic integration organization of its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, any instrument deposited by a
regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional
those deposited by States.
Article 37
Authentic texts
The original of the present Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese,
English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly
authorized thereto, have signed this Convention.







Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitration pursuant
to article 33 of the Convention shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14
of the present annex.
Article 2
The claimant party shall notify the respondent party that it is referring a
dispute to arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention. The notification
shall state the subject matter of arbitration and include, in particular, the articles
of the Convention, the interpretation or application of which are at issue. If the
parties do not agree on the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall
determine the subject matter.
Article 3
1. In disputes between two parties, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of
three members. Each of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator and
the two arbitrators so appointed shall designate by common agreement the third
arbitrator, who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not’ be a
national of one of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the
watercourse concerned, nor have his or her usual place of residence in the
territory of one of these parties or such riparian State, nor have dealt with the case
in any other capacity.
2. In disputes between more than two parties, parties in the same interest
shall appoint one arbitrator jointly by agreement.




1. If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within
two months of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the
International Court of Justice shall, at the request of a party, designate the
Chairman within a further two-month period.
2. If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within
two months of receipt of the request, the other party may inform the President of




The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention and international law.
Article 6
Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall
determine its own rules of procedure.
Article 7
The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the Parties, recommend
essential interim measures of protection.
Article 8
1. The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal
and, in particular, using all means at their disposal, shall:
(a) Provide it with all relevant documents, information and facilities; and
(b) Enable it’, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive
their evidence.
2. The parties and the arbitrators are under an obligation to protect the
confidentiality of any information they receive in confidence during the
proceedings of the arbitral tribunal.
Article 9
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular
circumstances of the case, the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties to
the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its costs, and
shall furnish a final statement thereof to the parties.
Article 10
Any Party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the
dispute which may be affected by the decision in the case, may intervene in the
proceedings with the consent of the tribunal.
Article 11
The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims arising directly out of
the subject matter of the dispute.
Article 12
Decisions both on procedure and substance of the arbitral tribunal shall be
taken by a majority vote of its members.
Article 13
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral
tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to
continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or a failure of
a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before
rendering its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is
well founded in fact and law.
Article 14
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1. The tribunal shall render its final decision within five months of the date
on which it is fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to extend the time limit
for a period which should not exceed five more months.
2. The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject
matter of the dispute and shall state the reasons on which it is based’. It shall
contain the names of the members who have participated and the date of the final
decision. Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting opinion
to the final decision.
3. The award shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. It shall be
without appeal unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an
appellate procedure.
4. Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as
regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the final decision may




1 For the report of the Sixth Committee on the work of the Working
Group at its first session, held from 7 to 25 October 1996, see document
A/51/624.
2 Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth Session,
Supplement No. 10 (A/49/10), chap. III.D.
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APPENDIX D: DELINEATION AML
/************************************************************
/* NAME: delin.aml
/* BY: Sean Reed
/* PURPOSE: Delineate drainage network and watersheds using a
/* digital elevation model.
/* INPUTS: delineation threshold and name of filled DEM
/* For information on how to obtain and fill a DEM see
/* http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/maidment/GISHydro/docs/amls/wtrshd.htm
/*  OUTPUTS: stream grid, stream coverage (covstr), and polygon coverage
/* (covwsh).
/*  COMMENTS:  This script should be executed from within Grid.
/************************************************************




/* INITIALIZE NAMES OF INPUT GRIDS AND THRESHOLD VALUE
&sv fill = map_fill
&if [exists fdr -grid] &then
  kill fdr all
&if [exists fac -grid] &then
  kill fac all
&if [exists covstr -cover] &then
  kill covstr all
&if [exists covwsh -cover] &then
  kill covwsh all
fdr = flowdirection(%fill%)
fac = flowaccumulation(fdr)
/*&sv thrd = [response ’Enter a delineation threshold’]
&sv thrd = 10000
&sv covname = covstr
&sv wshname = covwsh
/* ELIMINATE GRIDS FROM PREVIOUS RUNS
&if [exists str -grid] &then
  kill str all
&if [exists lnk -grid] &then
  kill lnk all
&if [exists znv -grid] &then
  kill znv all
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&if [exists out -grid] &then
  kill out all
&if [exists wsh -grid] &then
  kill wsh all
/* BEGIN CALCULATIONS
/* Identify all cells with a flowaccumulation greater than the threshold value.
str = con ( fac gt %thrd%, 1 )
/* Assign a unique value to cells in separate stream reaches.
lnk = streamlink ( str, fdr )
/*&if [exists str -grid] &then
/*  kill str all
/* Convert a grid of links into a line coverage.
/* Note that the STREAMLINE function should create arcs that are all
/*pointing downstream.
%covname% = streamline( lnk, fdr, grid-code, # )
/* For zones defined by the link grid, assign the maximum value of
/* flowaccumulation
/* in that zone to each cell in that zone.
znv = zonalmax ( lnk, fac )
/* Identify outlets as cells with the highest flowaccumulation in a
/* given stream reach.
out = con ( znv == fac, lnk )
&if [exists lnk -grid] &then
  kill lnk all
&if [exists znv -grid] &then
  kill znv all
/* Delineate watersheds
wsh = watershed ( fdr, out )
&if [exists out -grid] &then
  kill out all
/* Convert watershed grids to watershed polygons




&if [exists wsh -grid] &then
  kill wsh all




APPENDIX E: INLAND CATCHMENT AML
/* Program: fp.aml
/* Author: Francisco Olivera
/* Date: April 16, 1995
/* CRWR J.J.Pickle Research Center
/*
/* Input: dem <digital elevation model - grid>
/* area <screen input - real variable>
/* depth <screen input - real variable>
/* Output: demplus <corrected digital elevation model - grid>
/* filplus <corrected filled digital elevation model - grid>
/* fdrplus <corrected flow direction - grid>
/* Promt: Arc
/*
/* This aml corrects the DEM by assigning NODATA to the sink cells.
/* Sink cells are the bottom cells of those fillings with area and






&sv area = [response ’Minimum inland catchment area’]
&sv depth = [response ’Minimum inland catchment depth’]










/* Filling the DEM
fill fp01 fp02
/* Calculating the filled depths
fp03 = fp02 - fp01
kill fp02 all
/* Assigning the value 1 to all the filled cells and 2 elsewhere
fp04 = con(fp03 > 0, 1, 2)
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/* Assigning a label number to each to each pit (filled zone)
fp05 = regiongroup(fp04, #, eight)
kill fp04 all
/* Determining the area of each pit
fp06 = zonalarea(fp05)
/* Determining the depth of each pit
fp07 = zonalmax(fp05, fp03)
kill fp03 all
/* Assigning a label to each inland catchment and the value 0 elsewhere




/* Assigning the lowest elevation to all cells of each inland catchment
fp09 = zonalmin(fp08, fp01)
/* Assigning the value 0 to the lowest cell of each inland catchment
/* and 1 elsewhere
fp10 = con(fp09 == fp01 and fp08 <> 0, 0, 1)
kill fp08 all
kill fp09 all
/* Assigning NODATA to the lowest cell of each inland catchment
rename fp01 fp11
demplus = fp11 / fp10
kill fp10
kill fp11
/* Delineating streams and watersheds
fill demplus filplus # # fdrplus
facplus = flowaccumulation(fdrplus)
strplus = con(facplus > %threshold%, 1)
lnkplus = streamlink(strplus, fdrplus)
wshplus = watershed(fdrplus, lnkplus)





















! read (10,*) infile
! read (10,*) outfile1
! read (10,*) outfile2





      ncells = 1000




1  (netrad(i,k),k=1,12),(resvap(i,l),l=1,12), (temp(i,k),k=1,12)
 enddo
1100   continue
       ncells = i - 1
write (5, *) ncells, cellid(345),stmax(345),(p(345,j),j=1,12),
1  (netrad(345,k),k=1,12),(resvap(345,l),l=1,12), (temp(345,k),k=1,12)
! skip the header line that was created by an Avenue script
! read(21,*)





















if (i . ge. 563) write (5, *) ’on repart’
if (i . ge. 563) write (5, *)i
! --- begin pseudo-daily budgeting
do j=1,ndays(n)
if (i . ge. 563) write (5, *) i, k, n, j
if (i . ge. 563) write (5, *) st_temp, stmax(i)
satur=st_temp/stmax(i)
! if using the traditional method, redefine




if (temp(i,n) .ge. 2.) then
mstar = 0
else
melt = 2.63 + 2.55*temp(i,n) +
1 0.0912*temp(i,n)*p(i,n)
sstor(i+1) = sstor(i) + snow(i,n) - melt




if (melt .gt. 0) then



















! --- finished loop through days







! --- budgeting completed
enddo
! --- test for convergence
diff=st(i,1)-st(i,13)
if (abs(diff).lt.0.1) then
! write (5, *) ’notconv’
  notconv=.false.
    endif
! --- alter the initial soil moisture guess
st(i,1)=st(i,13)
! --- finished balancing for one cell
enddo
!  write (5, *), i, k
dst(i,1)=st(i,1)-st(i,12)
evap(i,1)=p(i,1)-surp(i,1)-dst(i,1)
!  write (5, *) dst(i,1), evap(i,1)
if (k.gt.30) then
write(*,*) ’Convergence not achieved after 30 iterations.’
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endif
! --- end of loop through cells
enddo
! --- check average cell surplus for Texas
! if the average surplus is within 2 mm, then quit
! otherwise, modify the runoff function
stot=0
do i=1,ncells
  do j = 1,12




! end the loop of repeating the calculations until total
! surplus in Texas converges
iter = iter + 1
!enddo
!write summarized results to a file
write(22,*) ’cellid,tot_p,tot_sur,tot_ev,avg_st,avg_sat’
do i=1,ncells





















write(*,*) ’Water budget complete.’
! ---------write(*,*) AA,BB,CC,DD
191
write(*,*) ’Avg. Surplus=’, avgsur, iter
stop
9000   format(i6,’,’,35(f7.2,’,’),f7.2)
9100   format(i6,’,’,4(f7.2,’,’),f6.4)
!10000 write(*,*) ’Could not open control file.’
! stop
10010 write(*,*) ’Could not open input file.’
stop
10020 write(*,*) ’Could not open output file1.’
10030 write(*,*) ’Could not open output file2.’
stop
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